Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts by Morley, Michael T




Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District Courts 
Michael T. Morley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District
Courts
MICHAEL T. MORLEY*
Three-judge federal district courts have jurisdiction over many issues
central to our democratic system, including constitutional challenges to
congressional and legislative districts, as well as to certain federal
campaign-finance statutes. They are similarly responsible for enforcing
key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. Litigants often have the right to
appeal their rulings directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Because of this
unusual appellate process, courts and commentators disagree on whether
such three-judge district court panels are bound by circuit precedent or
instead are free to adjudicate these critical issues constrained only by
U.S. Supreme Court rulings.
The applicability of court of appeals precedent in three-judge district
courts implicates larger questions about the justifications for, and scope
of, vertical stare decisis within the federal judiciary. The Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory of vertical stare decisis posits that, when adjudicat-
ing a case, the only precedent a court is required to apply is that of
tribunals with appellate jurisdiction over that particular matter. The
Structural Theory, in contrast, contends that a lower court must pre-
sumptively follow the precedent of other courts that are superior to it
within the judicial hierarchy.
A careful analysis of nearly a century's worth of federal laws estab-
lishing three-judge trial courts and allowing certain cases to be appealed
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court confirms that Congress does not legis-
late against the backdrop of the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory. To the
contrary, a Hybrid Theory combining both traditional approaches pro-
vides the best descriptive fit for past and present jurisdictional statutes
and unconventional appellate procedures. The Hybrid Theory specifies
that a court presumptively must follow the precedent of other tribunals
that either may have appellate jurisdiction over its rulings in a particular
case or are superior to it within the constitutional and statutory structure
of the judiciary. Applying this approach, a three-judge district court must
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follow its regional court of appeals's precedent, even though its rulings
are not subject to review there, because that court occupies a superior
position within the federal judicial hierarchy. This approach is most con-
sistent with the structure of three-judge district courts, Congress's pur-
poses in creating them, practical considerations, and the traditional
rationales underlying stare decisis.
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Throughout much of the twentieth century, when a plaintiff asked a federal
trial court to enjoin an allegedly unconstitutional federal or state law, the case
was heard by a panel of three judges, rather than by a single judge.2 Litigants
could appeal the court's ruling directly to the U.S. Supreme Court as of right,
bypassing the intermediate appellate court,3 without filing a petition for certiorari.
Some of the most critical cases in the constitutional canon-for example, Brown
v. Board of Education' and Roe v. Wade'-were adjudicated by three-judge dis-
trict court panels and appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. Due to the tre-
mendous burdens these requirements imposed on the federal judiciary, Congress
restricted the availability of three-judge district courts in 1976.6
Though their jurisdiction has been curtailed, three-judge district courts retain
authority over some of the most important cases before the federal judiciary:
those affecting the electoral process.7 Federal law empowers three-judge district
courts to hear challenges to the constitutionality of congressional and legislative
districts and two important federal campaign-finance statutes.9 Pursuant to this
authority, three-judge district courts adjudicated the recent spate of political
1. This Article uses the generic term "trial court" when not referring to a particular point in time
because Congress transferred original jurisdiction over constitutional claims between federal courts in
the early twentieth century. The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875 granted jurisdiction over such
cases to federal circuit courts, subject to a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement. Ch. 137, § 1, 18
Stat. 470, 470. The Judicial Code of 1911 abolished circuit courts and transferred original jurisdiction
over those cases to modem district courts. Ch. 231, §§ 1, 24, 289-91, 36 Stat. 1087, 1087, 1091, 1167.
2. See infra Section II.C.
3. This Article uses the generic phrase "intermediate appellate court" when not referring to a particular
point in time because this entity was originally called the "circuit court of appeals" when it was established
in 1891, Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826, and renamed the "U.S. Court of Appeals" in 1948,
Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2012)).
4. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (three-judge court), rev'd, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (per curiam) (three-judge court), aff d in part, rev'd in part,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. See infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
7. See Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 79, 81 (1996).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012).
9. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113-14
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30110 note (2012)); Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
178, sec. 801, § 9011(b)(2), 85 Stat. 497, 570 (1971) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2) (2012)) see
FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm'n, 470 U.S. 480, 484-85 (1985) (holding that
§ 9011(b) applies to suits for declaratory judgments concerning the constitutionality of the Fund Act);
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gerrymandering cases in which litigants urged the federal judiciary to treat such
claims as justiciable."o These courts also have jurisdiction over many types of suits
under the Voting Rights Act,1 as well as actions by the Attorney General to enforce
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment1 2 and constitutional prohibitions on poll taxes.13
Despite the lengthy heritage of three-judge district courts, disagreement per-
sists over whether they must apply the law of the circuits in which they sit.14 This
dispute arises from competing underlying theories of vertical stare decisis."
Many courts apply the "Structural Theory," which specifies that a court must pre-
sumptively follow the precedent of other courts that are superior to it within the
judicial hierarchy, regardless of whether those "higher" courts are able to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over a particular case. Under this approach, vertical stare
decisis is a function of the judiciary's hierarchical structure. A three-judge district
court applying the Structural Theory must follow the precedent of both the U.S.
cf. 26 U.S.C. § 9010(c) (2012) (authorizing three-judge district courts to adjudicate certain actions for
injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce the Act).
10. See, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018) (three-judge court) (entering
summary judgment for plaintiffs), vacated and remanded sub nom. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2484 (2019); Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (three-judge court), vacated
and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md. 2017) (three-
judge court) (denying motion for preliminary injunction), aff d, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018); Whitford v. Gill,
218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
11. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(g) (Supp. II 2015) (litigation over whether a jurisdiction engaged in a pattern
or practice of racial discrimination with regard to voting); id. § 10303(a)(5) (bailout litigation); id.
§ 10304(a) (preclearance litigation); id. § 10504 (racial discrimination with regard to voting).
12. Id. § 10701(a)(2).
13. Id. § 10306(c). Shortly after this provision was enacted, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment was
adopted, prohibiting poll taxes for federal elections. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. Soon thereafter, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections that the Equal Protection Clause
similarly proscribes poll taxes for state and local elections. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
14. See, e.g., LaVergne v. U.S. House of Representatives, No. 17-793 (CKK-CP-RDM), 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 152345, at *29 n.3 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2018) (three-judge court) ("There is some question as
to whether the precedent of the circuit in which a three-judge district court sits is binding on that
court."); Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1286-87 (N.D. Ga.
2017) (three-judge court) (Duffey, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding "it is unclear whether a
three-judge panel is bound by its circuit's precedent"); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 988
F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1342 n.13 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (three-judge court) (Thompson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("There is a separate question as to whether this three-judge district court convened
under 28 U.S.C. § 2284, for which appellate jurisdiction bypasses the Eleventh Circuit and proceeds
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, must apply the case law of the Eleventh Circuit."); Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 n.16 (E.D. Wash.
1978) (three-judge court) (declining to resolve "whether this Court, as a three-judge District Court, is
bound by the law of the Circuit in which it sits"), aff d in part, rev'd in part, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Poe v.
Werner, 386 F. Supp. 1014, 1016-17 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (noting the "difference of opinion among the
federal courts" about "whether a three-judge court is bound to follow the decisions of the court of
appeals for the circuit in which it is located"); see also Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine,
Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413 (2019) (arguing
that the U.S. Supreme Court's summary dispositions should get little or no precedential value and that
three-judge district courts are not required to follow court of appeals precedent).
15. It is accepted generally accepted that, at a minimum, a three-judge district court is free to
voluntarily abide by its circuit's precedents if it finds them persuasive, just as it may choose to follow
other circuits' precedents or even recommendations in law review articles.
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Supreme Court and its regional U.S. Court of Appeals because of their respective
places within the judicial hierarchy.16
Other three-judge district court opinions instead defend the "Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory," which provides that a court is bound only by the precedent
of other courts that have appellate jurisdiction over a particular case.1 7 This
theory dictates that, because three-judge district ourts' rulings are usually
appealable only to the U.S. Supreme Court,1s such courts are not bound by any
precedent other than U.S. Supreme Court opinions. Professors Joshua Douglas
and Michael Solimine vigorously defend this view in an article in Volume 107 of
The Georgetown Law Journal.19 This issue has arisen in numerous contexts,
including whether three-judge district ourts must follow circuit precedent con-
cerning issue preclusion,20 Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,21 "one
person, one vote" principles,2 2 and the Voting Rights Act,23 as well as numerous
other important and potentially dispositive matters.
Little scholarship exists on either vertical stare decisis within the lower
courts24  or the role and functioning of modern three-judge district
16. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rockefeller, 431 F.2d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a three-judge
district court "sit[s] as a district court" and is therefore bound by its circuit's precedent); Ala. Legislative
Black Caucus, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 1306 ("A three-judge district court is still a district court within the
ordinary hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary."); Russell v. Hathaway, 423 F. Supp. 833, 835
(N.D. Tex. 1976) (three-judge court) ("A three-judge court is bound by apposite decisions of the Court
of Appeals for its circuit. The addition by Congress in the three-judge court acts of a second district
judge and a Circuit Judge together with direct appeal to the Supreme Court was not a grant of authority
with elevated precedential stature but a withdrawal of power from a single judge.").
17. See, e.g., Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1112 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court) (Gwin,
J., concurring) ("If our decision is reviewable only by the Supreme Court, logic suggests that we are not
bound by circuit authority."); see also LaVergne, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152345, at *29 n.3; Ala. Legislative
Black Caucus, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 n.13 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Jehovah's Witnesses of Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1 (Harborview), 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-05 (W.D.
Wash. 1967) (three-judge court) ("In this special three-judge court case we are not bound by any judicial
decisions other than those of the United States Supreme Court."), aff dper curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
18. But see infra Part IV.
19. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 419 (arguing that "circuit precedent is not formally
binding on three-judge district courts," and district courts accordingly "have no ... obligation" to "apply
precedent from the circuit in which they sit"). Some scholars, rejecting both views, boldly declare that
lower courts have no obligation to accept higher court precedent as binding at all. See, e.g., Paul L.
Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1041,
1058 (1987); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M.
Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 85 (1989).
20. LaVergne, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152345, at *29 n.3.
21. Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. Georgia, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1286-87 (N.D. Ga. 2017)
(three-judge court) (Duffey, J., concurring in judgment).
22. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-05.
23. Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1112 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (three-judge court) (Gwin, J.,
concurring).
24. Professors Evan Caminker and Jeffrey Dobbins have written the seminal articles concerning
vertical stare decisis. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 866-67 (1994) (arguing that district courts should not be required to
follow court of appeals precedent in all cases, even when the court of appeals may exercise appellate
jurisdiction); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1490 (2010)
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courts.25 This is consistent with the lack of attention the academy usually pays to
lower courts26 until issues such as nationwide injunctions force public attention
on them.2 7 Most previously published pieces concerning three-judge trial courts
were primarily descriptive, delving into these courts' jurisdictional limits. 28
Many focused on the puzzle of whether a judge's refusal to convene a three-judge
(concluding that a "nonstandard appellate process[]" should neither generate "cross-circuit binding
precedent," nor bind a court to precedents of other courts that are "not regularly in a direct appellate
relationship" with it, "unless Congress clearly states its view to the contrary"). A powerful defense of
the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory may be found in John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules
ofPrecedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 513-31 (2000). For an analysis of the history and development of stare
decisis that touches on vertical stare decisis, see Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective:
From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 664 & n.84 (1999).
Many important works on stare decisis focus on horizontal stare decisis without discussing the
separate issues raised by its vertical counterpart. See, e.g., Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior
Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787 (2012) (advocating the adoption of horizontal stare decisis
within district courts); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987) (defending
horizontal stare decisis); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An
Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008) (developing guidelines for determining when the U.S.
Supreme Court should overturn its own precedents).
25. The most comprehensive, though dated, analysis of three-judge federal trial courts is David P.
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1964).
Professor Solimine provides an engaging history of the development and later curtailment of three-judge
trial courts' jurisdiction in Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-
Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101 (2008). A detailed early history of three-judge trial courts
is set forth in Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795, 803-13 (1934),
and their evolution is insightfully described by The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in
Federal-State Relationships, 72 YALE L.J. 1646, 1651 (1963) [hereinafter The Three-Judge Court
Reassessed]. Professor Solimine has also written specifically about the use of three-judge district courts
in voting rights litigation. See Solimine, supra note 7. That piece discusses the unique potential for
forum shopping such courts allow, attempts by the chief judges of certain circuits to "stack[]" three-
judge district court panels with ideological allies, the way three-judge panels function, and the role of
partisanship in their decisions. Id. at 82-83. It argues that three-judge district courts are no longer
necessary in voting rights cases and that their jurisdiction should not be extended to other areas. Id.
at 126-29.
26. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81 (1994) ("[S]cholars have focused very little on how lower court
judges ought to define and execute their subordinate roles .. . .").
27. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of
the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 620-21 (2017) (arguing that lower courts should avoid issuing
nationwide injunctions in class-action cases against the government by certifying only district- or
circuit-wide classes under Rule 23(b)(2)).
28. See, e.g., Alfred W. Bowen, When Are Three Federal Judges Required?: An Inquiry into the
Meaning of Section 266 of the Judicial Code, 16 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35-41 (1931); Albert C. Harvey,
Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Challenges to State Action, 34 TENN. L. REV. 235, 239-47
(1967); Elliott S. Marks & Alan H. Schoem, Comment, The Applicability of Three-Judge Courts in
Contemporary Law: A Viable Legal Procedure or a Legal Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 Am. U. L. REV.
417, 425-31 (1972); The Three-Judge Federal Court: A Study of Injunctions Against Discriminatory
State Action, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 811 (1956) [hereinafter A Study of Injunctions]; see also William J.
Barnds, Note, A Survey of the Three Judge Requirement, 47 GEO. L.J. 161, 164 (1958); Stephen J. Ledet,
Jr., Comment, Requirement of Substantial Constitutional Question in Federal Three-Judge Court Cases,
19 LA. L. REV. 813, 824-30 (1959).
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panel was subject to appeal to an intermediate appellate court, appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, or mandamus from the U.S. Supreme Court.29
Some pieces published during the Civil Rights Era examined the availability of
three-judge courts in desegregation cases.30 Others proposed statutory reforms to
simplify their procedural and jurisdictional rules.31 The American Law Institute
(ALI), 3 2 as well as some commentators,33 recommended narrowing their jurisdic-
tion. At least one author went further by suggesting that Congress abolish them.34
29. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Appellate Review of the Decision Whether or Not to Empanel a Three-
Judge Federal Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 160-62 (1969) (identifying the proper methods of
obtaining appellate review for various possible scenarios); George M. Johnson & James A. Washington,
Jr., One or Three, Which Should It Be? Conjectures on Three-Judge Court Procedure, 1 How. L.J. 194,
201-20 (1955) (discussing the scope of a single judge's authority to dismiss a case for want of a
substantial federal question without convening a three-judge panel); see also John E. Lockwood et al.,
The Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 426, 456 (1930)
(suggesting statutory amendment to alleviate appellate issues); cf. William Berueffy, The Three Judge
Federal Court: Recent Statutory Limitations, 15 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 64, 67-74 (1942) (explaining that
prudent counsel must sometimes appeal to the court of appeals and seek a writ of mandamus from the
U.S. Supreme Court simultaneously when a three-judge district court adjudicates a case outside its
jurisdiction); supra note 28 (citing sources).
30. Harry Lee Hudspeth, Comment, Federal Jurisdiction in the Segregation Cases: The Three-Judge
Court and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 36 TEX. L. REV. 812, 813-17 (1958); Johnson &
Washington, supra note 29, at 199-201; A Study ofInjunctions, supra note 28, at 826-32.
31. Alan M. Gunn, Note, Three-Judge District Courts: Some Problems and a Proposal, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 928, 939-42 (1969) (discussing controversies over when a constitutional issue is sufficiently
substantial, and a challenged law has sufficiently broad applicability, to require adjudication by a three-
judge district court, and arguing that a single judge should be permitted to adjudicate all issues in such
cases except for the ultimate constitutional question); Marks & Schoem, supra note 28, at 438-43
(discussing multiple proposals to reform three-judge district courts); Note, The Three-Judge District
Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281, 77 HARV. L. REV. 299, 316-17 (1963) [hereinafter
Scope and Procedure] (defending the need for three-judge district courts, but arguing that the U.S.
Supreme Court should allow individual judges and courts of appeals to play a larger role in dismissing
cases without convening such panels); see also Lockwood et al., supra note 29, at 456 (arguing that
federal law should be amended to require federal courts to abstain from adjudicating constitutional
challenges to state or local laws when relief is available in state court); Comment, The Three-Judge
District Court in Contemporary Federal Jurisdiction, 41 WASH. L. REV. 877, 883-89, 892 & n.100
(1966) (discussing the evolution of the Court's approach to three-judge trial courts in Supremacy Clause
challenges and suggesting that such courts should be available even when a plaintiff seeks only
declaratory relief, while direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court should be curtailed).
32. The ALI's study on the respective jurisdictions of federal and state courts called for three-judge
district courts to adjudicate constitutional challenges to state laws and administrative orders, but not to
federal measures. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 324-25 (1969); see also Sidney B. Jacoby, Recent Proposals and Legislative Efforts to Limit
Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction, 26 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 32, 53-58 (1975) (discussing the ALI
study and legislative responses to it, and suggesting that three-judge district courts be available only for
challenges to state laws of general applicability or patterns of illegal or unconstitutional state conduct,
and that direct Supreme Court review be available only in certain cases of public importance).
33. See, e.g., Scope and Procedure, supra note 31, at 303 (arguing that three-judge district courts are
appropriate for claims concerning "racial discrimination, legislative apportionment, and religion-in-the-
schools"); The Three-Judge Court Reassessed, supra note 25, at 1660 (arguing that the jurisdiction of
three-judge district courts should be limited to desegregation cases, reapportionment cases, and cases
involving important federal statutes for which national uniformity is especially necessary).
34. See, e.g., Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural
Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 571 (1960) (noting that "retention of the three-judge procedure is
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This Article offers a fresh perspective on the growth and gradual moderniza-
tion of three-judge trial courts, tracing their role in not only constitutional litiga-
tion, but antitrust, civil rights, and judicial review of administrative agencies as
well. Based on a close analysis of the statutes governing three-judge trial courts
over nearly a century, this Article demonstrates that such panels are bound by
their respective intermediate appellate courts' precedents and may not treat such
case law as merely persuasive. Finally, this piece presents a new theoretical
approach to vertical stare decisis, arguing that federal district courts, including
three judge panels, must follow their respective courts of appeals' bodies of prec-
edent based on a hybrid of the Appellate Jurisdiction and Structural Theories.
Under this hybrid approach, a court presumptively must follow the precedents
of other courts that either: (i) have appellate jurisdiction over its rulings in a par-
ticular case, or (ii) are superior to it within the constitutional and statutory struc-
ture of the judiciary. Congress may displace either of these presumptions through
a clear statement or other persuasive indicia of intent, including the structural
implications of a statutory scheme. This Hybrid Theory requires district courts to
presumptively follow the precedents of their respective courts of appeals and the
U.S. Supreme Court, even in cases over which those courts lack appellate
jurisdiction.
The Hybrid Theory has consequences even beyond the context of three-judge
district courts. For example, Congress historically did not grant the U.S. Supreme
Court jurisdiction over many important types of cases, including capital cases.35
Even today, certain district court rulings are exempt from any appellate review.36
The Hybrid Theory specifies that district courts are nevertheless required to apply
precedents from both their respective regional courts of appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court in such cases. The theory also helps explain other unusual appel-
late structures, such as that of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Critically, however, even if one rejects this theoretical framework and instead
adopts the traditional Appellate Jurisdiction Theory, three-judge district courts
are still bound by court of appeals precedent because there are numerous, often
overlooked circumstances in which courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction
over these panels' rulings.37
One might object that it does not matter what body of law a three-judge district
court applies, because direct Supreme Court review is available. Rather than
granting plenary review of a three-judge district court's judgment, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court might instead decide to summarily affirm it.38 Such summary
unjustified" because "[t]he needs for which it was designed are largely a thing of the past, and its
remaining functions have been taken over by other procedures").
35. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 342-46 and accompanying text.
37. See infra Part IV; cf. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 447 & n.200 (identifying exceptions
where a three-judge district court's decisions are subject to appellate review by the regional court of
appeals).
38. SUP. CT. R. 18.12 (recognizing the Court's authority to "dispose summarily of [an] appeal").
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affirmances carry limited precedential effect39 and may do little to settle the law
for future litigants.40 Moreover, justiciability or other threshold issues in a case
might delay or even preclude the Court from reaching the merits.41 And even if
the U.S. Supreme Court does adjudicate the matter, a three-judge district court's
ruling can have serious consequences for litigants in the interim. Indeed, the pos-
sibility of eventual Supreme Court review has not prevented trial courts' nation-
wide injunctions from attracting national attention and generating heated
controversy.4 2 Finally, most basically, considerations of fairness, equity, and judi-
cial economy require both lower courts and litigants to know the body of law that
governs their cases.
Part I of this Article begins by introducing the concept of vertical stare decisis
and the two main theories for applying it: the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory and
the Structural Theory. Although these theories lead to the same outcomes most of
the time,43 they often yield conflicting results when applied to unusual appellate
structures. This Part demonstrates that the judiciary's overall structure, under
both the Judiciary Act of 178944 and the Evarts Act of 1891,45 suggests that
39. See Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1800 (2015) (noting that a summary
affirmance has "considerably less precedential value than an opinion on the merits" (quoting Ill. Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1979))); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 785 n.5 (1983) ("A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below,
and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment.").
40. See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 312 (10th ed. 2013) (discussing the
"element of confusion" in applying the U.S. Supreme Court's summary dispositions of district court
rulings).
41. The recent political gerrymandering cases are a prime example of this possibility. The Court was
initially expected to determine the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims in 2018 in Whitford
v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct.
1916 (2018), and Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md. 2017) (three-judge court), aff d, 138
S. Ct. 1942 (2018). The Court held that the plaintiffs in Gill lacked standing, 138 S. Ct. at 1933-34, and
the plaintiffs inBenisek did not satisfy the equitable requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction,
138 S. Ct. at 1944-45. It therefore did not reach the merits of either case, and the justiciability of
political gerrymandering claims remained unresolved for another year, until the Court finally held them
to be nonjusticiable in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506-07 (2019). In the interim, a
three-judge federal district court in Ohio struck down the state's congressional maps as an impermissible
partisan gerrymander under A ticle I of the Constitution. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder,
373 F. Supp. 3d 978, 993-94 (S.D. Ohio 2019), stay granted, 139 S. Ct. 2635 (2019) (mem.), vacated
and remanded, 140 S. Ct. 101 (2019) (mem.). The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that ruling following
Rucho.Householder, 140 S. Ct. 101 (2019) (mem.).
42. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented
Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 487 (2016) (discussing the various approaches to injunctions that lower courts have applied in
election law cases); Morley, supra note 27 (examining the use of nationwide injunctions in Rule 23(b)
(2) class actions against the government).
43. Under the Structural Theory, a district court must presumptively follow the precedents of its
regional court of appeals, because the court of appeals is superior to it within the judicial hierarchy.
Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory, a district court must almost always follow the precedent of its
regional court of appeals, because that court has appellate jurisdiction over most of its rulings. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); cf. infra notes 336-41 and accompanying text (discussing the appellate
jurisdiction of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its impact on vertical stare decisis).
44. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
45. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
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Congress does not implicitly legislate against the backdrop of the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory.
Part II turns specifically to the history of three-judge trial courts and other laws
permitting direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. Reviewing nearly a cen-
tury's worth of jurisdictional statutes, this Part shows that applying the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory would have led to inconsistent and even incoherent results.
Indeed, under several provisions, the court that had appellate jurisdiction over a
matter depended on how the trial court ruled or the litigants' actions after final
judgment. Such arrangements made it impossible for a trial court to apply the
Appellate Jurisdiction Theory to determine which precedents governed its rul-
ings. The modem statute governing most three-judge district courts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284, directly descends from these precursors.
This analysis of the creation and evolution of three-judge trial courts also
reveals that allowing them to disregard intermediate appellate courts' precedents
would be inconsistent with one of the main purposes of such panels: cabining the
discretion of lone, potentially idiosyncratic judges.46 Moreover, as Congress con-
tinuously adjusted the jurisdiction of three-judge trial courts over nearly a cen-
tury, nothing in either the text or legislative history of the relevant statutes
suggested that these jurisdictional shifts affected the body of law that trial judges
were required to treat as binding.
Part III explains that a hybrid of the Structural and Appellate Jurisdiction
Theories is the best approach to vertical stare decisis. Under the Hybrid Theory, a
court's presumptive obligation to follow another court's precedents may arise either
from the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary or that other court's power to
exercise appellate jurisdiction over a particular case. The Hybrid Theory provides a
better fit with both the century-long history of federal jurisdictional statutes, as well
as modem unusual appellate structures, than either the Appellate Jurisdiction or
Structural Theories alone. Many of the rationales underlying theories of stare decisis
in general also weigh heavily in favor of this hybrid approach. This Part concludes
by turning to the specific case of three-judge courts, presenting legal-process,47 prac-
tical, and structural considerations that bolster the Hybrid Theory and confirm that
such courts are bound by the precedents of their regional courts of appeals.
Part IV demonstrates that, even if one exclusively applies the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory, modem three-judge federal district courts are still bound by
their regional courts of appeals' precedents. Statutory provisions authorizing
direct appeals from three-judge district courts to the U.S. Supreme Court never-
theless allow courts of appeals to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a sweeping
range of those three-judge courts' rulings. Many of the issues over which courts
of appeals have appellate jurisdiction are inextricably intertwined with the cases'
ultimate merits. Allowing three-judge district courts to apply different bodies of
46. See infra notes 182-83, 269-72 and accompanying text.
47. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS




precedent o various issues within a case, depending on the court to which each is
appealable, would be impracticable and invite internally contradictory results.
The Article then briefly concludes, reemphasizing that, regardless of the theory
of vertical stare decisis one adopts, three-judge district court panels are bound by
court of appeals precedent. As Professors Douglas and Solimine argue, three-
judge district courts are responsible for resolving critical issues central to the law
of democracy.48 It is therefore important to have a firm and accurate understand-
ing of the body of law these courts are bound to apply.
I. PRECEDENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDICIARY
Vertical stare decisis is the principle that a court must follow and apply (that is,
treat as binding law) the precedents of some other court or courts within the judicial
system, even if it disagrees with those precedents or believes them to be wrongly
decided.4 9 The Appellate Jurisdiction Theory of vertical stare decisis, which
Professors Douglas and Solimine advocate,0 provides that a trial court is bound only
by the precedents of courts that have appellate jurisdiction to review its rulings in a
particular case." Under this view, the body of precedent governing a matter must be
determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the courts that have appellate juris-
diction over it. Because a district court's judgments may typically be appealed to its
regional court of appeals,5 2 it is usually bound to apply that court's precedents. When
cases are directly appealable from a district court to the U.S. Supreme Court, how-
ever, the district court is only required to apply U.S. Supreme Court rulings and is not
bound by either its court of appeals or other district court precedents.53
An alternate explanation of vertical stare decisis is the Structural Theory. This
theory posits that a court's presumptive duty to follow another court's precedents
48. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 419; see also Solimine, supra note 7, at 128-29.
49. Caminker, supra note 26, at 3; Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement,
104 W. VA. L. REv. 43, 52 (2001); see also Schauer, supra note 24, at 592-93 ("[A] binding precedent is
one that must either be followed or distinguished.").
50. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 441-42 ("A circuit court cannot review the decision of a
three-judge district court, so a three-judge district court need not, as a matter of formal judicial
decisionmaking, adhere to circuit precedent.").
51. Under the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory, a trial court is bound by the rulings of both the court
that has immediate appellate jurisdiction over a case, as well as any other courts to which subsequent
appeals in the matter may be taken. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 26, at 12 (explaining that an inferior
court must follow the precedents of "courts that exercise revisory jurisdiction over it"); Caminker, supra
note 24, at 824 ("District courts must follow both Supreme Court decisions and those issued by
whichever court of appeals has revisory jurisdiction over its decisions . . . . [A] court can ignore
precedents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it."); Dobbins,
supra note 24, at 1463 ("Under the standard model of precedent, the bindingness of a prior decision
turns most clearly on whether that prior decision was issued by a court with the power of appellate (or
discretionary) review over the court deciding a subsequent case."); BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW
OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 28 (2016) ("Vertical precedents follow 'the path of appellate review."' (quoting
Caminker, supra note 24, at 825)); Harrison, supra note 24, at 518 ("[T]he scope of vertical stare decisis
is determined by appellate jurisdiction and it is absolute.").
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
53. See Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 441-42; see, e.g., supra note 17.
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arises from the structure of the judicial system,54 which is created by a combina-
tion of constitutional and statutory provisions." Of course, hierarchically superior
courts usually have appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of courts that are
structurally subordinate to them.56 The Structural Theory's distinguishing charac-
teristic is that a lower court's duty to follow a superior court's precedents neither
arises from, nor depends upon, the superior court's ability to exercise appellate ju-
risdiction over a particular case. Instead, that duty is a function of the overall struc-
ture of the judicial hierarchy itself. Lines of appellate jurisdiction comprise only
one-admittedly important-aspect of that hierarchy. Most of the time, the
Structural Theory directs trial courts to apply the same bodies of precedent as the
Appellate Jurisdiction Theory. These theories' directives differ, however, when
they are applied to unusual appellate structures such asthree-judge district courts.
There is no, and has never been any, federal statute expressly adopting a theory
of stare decisis or specifying which precedents a trial court must follow. In the
absence of direct textual guidance, this Article applies a variety of related
approaches to statutory interpretation. First, it emphasizes the structure of federal
jurisdictional laws, drawing inferences and advocating interpretations that, when
applied consistently throughout each statute, avoid absurd or anomalous results
and prevent disparities or inequities among similarly situated litigants.5 7 Second,
it seeks to promote coherence in the law, urging interpretations that provide the
54. See, e.g., Dobbins, supra note 24, at 1459 ("[T]he structure of the court system within which
judicial decisions are made-the structure of the appellate universe-is critical to defining the rules of
precedent that function within it."); Amy J. Griffin, Dethroning the Hierarchy of Authority, 97 OR. L.
REV. 51, 59 (2018) ("[C]ourts are bound by the decisions of courts above them in the court system
hierarchy."); Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court
Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 78 (2015) ("The obligation to follow
precedent does not perfectly track the power of revisionary review, however."); Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1006 & n.155 (1992) ("Decisions of
superior courts are the most powerful form of precedent. They are regarded as legally binding on lower
courts. . . . It is not plausible to view this norm [of vertical stare decisis] as simply grounded in an
empirical generalization that a lower court will get reversed by a superior court if it fails to follow
superior court precedent."); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that the rules for identifying "binding authority" reflect "the organization and structure of the federal
courts"); HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE SCIENCE
OF CASE LAW 330 (1912) ("[W]hen a circuit court of appeals has pronounced its decision upon a matter
of law, it becomes a closed question for the inferior federal courts in that circuit. . . . The decision of the
court above is a conclusive and binding precedent and must be followed."); Frederick G. Kempin, Jr.,
Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 28, 53-54 (1959)
(tracing American courts' treatment of precedent to the hierarchy of the judiciary and reliability of
written reports of opinions); Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis in United States Courts, in 18 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 134.02[2] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2010) ("[T]he district courts in a circuit
owe obedience to a decision of the court of appeals in that circuit and ordinarily must follow it until the
court of appeals overrules it.").
55. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
57. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("[I]nterpretations of a statute which
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative explanations consistent with the legislative
purpose are available."); cf. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN




best "fit" with the general fabric of the law and avoid unnecessary or unexplained
tensions among legal provisions." Third, by identifying consistencies or patterns,
both within particular statutes as they evolve over time, as well as across different
statutes, this Article attempts to determine whether Congress implicitly legislates
in light of certain assumptions, or against a certain theoretical "backdrop[]."5
Based on this approach, federal jurisdictional laws should not be interpreted as
incorporating, requiring, or even authorizing federal courts to apply the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory. This Part applies this interpretive methodology to the stat-
utes that created the general structure of the federal judiciary: the Judiciary Act of
1789 and the Evarts Act of 1891.
A. PRECEDENT UNDER THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the federal judiciary.60 It created three
tiers of federal courts, divided geographically into districts and circuits. The Act
created thirteen judicial districts, each with a district court staffed by a district
judge.6 1 District courts had exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty cases, seizures
on land, and penalties and forfeitures under federal law.6 2 They also had concur-
rent jurisdiction with circuit courts over minor criminal offenses,63 suits under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, and suits by the United States where the amount in contro-
versy exceeded $100.64
The districts were arranged into three circuits, each of which had a circuit
court. 5 Each circuit court was required to sit twice annually in each of the dis-
tricts within its region.66 The circuit courts did not have their own judges. Rather,
a circuit court was comprised of two Supreme Court Justices and the district
judge of the district in which the court was sitting.6 7 Circuit courts acted as both
trial and appellate courts. As trial courts, they had original jurisdiction over diver-
sity suits, suits involving an alien, and suits by the United States, all subject to a
$500 amount-in-controversy requirement.68 They also had jurisdiction over all
federal criminal offenses, including concurrent jurisdiction with district courts
over minor offenses.6 9 In their appellate capacity, circuit courts could hear
58. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (discussing the role of coherence in
interpreting the law).
59. Cf. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1813 (2012) (discussing
various types of "backdrops" that assist in constitutional interpretation).
60. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
61. Id. §§ 2-3.
62. Id. § 9.
63. Id.; see also id. § 11 (confirming circuit courts' concurrent jurisdiction over minor criminal
offenses).
64. Id. § 9. District courts also had concurrent jurisdiction with circuit courts over suits against
consuls and vice-consuls. Id.
65. Id. § 4.
66. Id.
67. Id. Congress soon amended this requirement so that each circuit court was comprised of one
district judge and one Supreme Court Justice. See Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333.
68. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11.
69. Id.
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appeals from district courts' decrees in admiralty cases in which the amount in
controversy exceeded $30070 and grant writs of error from district courts' judg-
ments in other civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded $50.71
Although we typically do not think of it as such, the U.S. Supreme Court was
also a combined trial and appellate court,7 2 though it tilted much more heavily to-
ward appellate work. The Judiciary Act gave the U.S. Supreme Court original ju-
risdiction over any civil suits in which a state was a party, except between a state
and its own citizens, as well as suits involving certain diplomatic personnel.73
The Court had appellate jurisdiction over circuit courts' judgments in civil cases
in which the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000.74
The structure of the Judiciary Act is inconsistent with the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory in several respects. First, the Act greatly circumscribed both
the U.S. Supreme Court's power to review circuit courts' judgments (whether by
appeal or writ of error), as well as circuit courts' authority to review district
courts' judgments. Most notably, criminal cases-including capital cases75
were not subject to any appellate review,76 except for the limited relief available
through habeas corpus.77 District court judgments in civil cases involving less
than $50 and admiralty cases involving less than $300, as well as circuit court
judgments in civil cases where the "matter in dispute" was less than $2,000, were
similarly immune from appellate review.78 It would be unreasonable-and a
threat to the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutionally mandated supremacy over the
federal judiciary79 -to interpret the Act as authorizing district and circuit courts
to reject Supreme Court precedent when adjudicating criminal and many civil
cases, simply because those matters were not subject to Supreme Court review.
Second, similarly, given that the availability of appellate review in civil cases in
both the circuit courts and U.S. Supreme Court depended on the amount in con-
troversy, it would be unreasonable to conclude that a lower court's obligation to
apply superior courts' precedents-and hence the body of law that governed a
case-depended on the amount at issue. The same court should not be able to
70. Id. §§ 11, 21.
7 1. Id.§ 22.
72. See Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 210
(2013) ("The Court heard at least three cases with juries in the 1790s, only one of which was reported:
Georgia v. Brailsford." (citing Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794))).
73. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
74. Judiciary Act of 1789 §§ 13, 22; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
75. The U.S. Supreme Court was not given appellate jurisdiction over capital cases until 1889. See
Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 655, 656.
76. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1226 n.84 (2001);
see United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173-74 (1805) (holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789
did not grant the U.S. Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over convictions in circuit court); see, e.g.,
Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847) (reading the Judiciary Act to preclude Supreme
Court review of cases that do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, including criminal
cases).
77. Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14.
78. Id. §§ 21-22.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; infra note 330.
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treat similarly situated litigants presenting the same legal claims differently,
based solely on the amount each sought.
Finally, and perhaps most notably, circuit courts were composed of district
judges and Supreme Court Justices. District judges could be expected to follow
circuit courts' rulings, regardless of the extent of their appellate jurisdiction,
because the district judges themselves sat on those courts. Indeed, because
Supreme Court Justices were frequently absent from circuit court sittings, the cir-
cuit court would often be held by a district judge sitting alone.0 Likewise, the
inclusion of Supreme Court Justices on circuit courts implied those courts would
act consistently with Supreme Court precedent, regardless of whether their cases
were appealable there.
The 1802 amendments to the Judiciary Act only increased the tension between
the judiciary's structure and the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory. Congress
expanded the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, allowing it to hear any
issues of law on which the circuit-court judges disagreed in any criminal or civil
case.s1 Thus, circuit judges could not know whether the U.S. Supreme Court
would have appellate jurisdiction over a criminal case or a civil case involving
less than $2,000 until they decided the matter. It would have been untenable, if
not impossible, for the applicability of Supreme Court precedent to depend on
whether the circuit judges agreed with each other. 82
In 1889, Congress further expanded the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction by
allowing a losing litigant to take an appeal or writ of error from the circuit court
80. The Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 158, allowed a single judge, including a
district judge, to sit alone as a circuit court. See Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421,429 (1808).
81. Judiciary Act of 1802 § 6. The procedure for securing U.S. Supreme Court review of issues on
which circuit-court judges disagreed was amended by the Practice Conformity Act, ch. 255, §§ 1-2, 17
Stat. 196, 196-97 (1872), and again by 13 REV. STAT. §§ 650-52, 693, 697 (1875). See United States v.
Rider, 163 U.S. 132 (1896) (tracing the history of these provisions); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310 (1892) (same).
82. In 1864, Congress enacted a law providing for appeals directly from the district court to the U.S.
Supreme Court in prize cases in which either the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000 or the district
judge certified "that the adjudication involve[d] a question of general importance." Act of June 30, 1864,
ch. 174, § 13, 13 Stat. 306, 310-11. It appears that district courts treated circuit court precedent as
binding in cases subject to this statute, even though they were directly appealable to the U.S. Supreme
Court. See Flaherty v. Doane, No. 4,849, 1867 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 1867) ("The
decisions in the circuit court are, that, where the master of a fishing vessel becomes the owner for
the voyage, the general owners are not personally liable for such supplies obtained in the home port, as the
master had undertaken to furnish at his own expense."); cf. The Max Morris, 24 F. 860, 863 (S.D.N.Y.
1885) ("No decision has been made upon the precise point in this circuit.").
This law is inconsistent with the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory because cases in which the amount in
controversy was $2,000 or less were potentially appealable to either the circuit court or the Supreme
Court, depending on whether the district judge determined that it "involve[d] a question of general
importance." Act of June 30, 1864 § 13. There is no indication that Congress intended different bodies
of precedent o apply to the same prize cases, depending on the amount in controversy or the importance
of the case. Applying the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory could have led to contradictory rulings, and
similarly situated litigants being treated differently, by the same court. Also, the Appellate Jurisdiction
Theory would have required the judge to determine in advance whether each case involved a "question
of general importance" in order to identify the proper route of appellate review and, hence, the body of
law that applied.
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to the U.S. Supreme Court in any case "in which there shall have been a question
involving the jurisdiction of the [circuit] court."83 This statute specified that,
when the final judgment or decree did not exceed $5,000, the Court could review
only the jurisdictional question; otherwise, it could review any other issues in the
case, as well.8 4 Thus, rather than adopt a traditional amount-in-controversy
requirement," the 1889 Act provided that the Court's power to review substan-
tive issues in a case involving a jurisdictional dispute depended on its outcome.86
This provision was inconsistent with the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory because it
would have been impossible for the circuit court to determine whether its rulings
on substantive issues would be subject to Supreme Court review until final judg-
ment was entered.
The relevance of the Judiciary Act and subsequent jurisdictional statutes build-
ing upon it may be limited, however, because Congress fundamentally restruc-
tured the judiciary with the Evarts Act of 1891.87 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court's constitutional supremacy relative to other "inferior" federal courts88 may
require them to follow Supreme Court precedent in all cases, regardless of
whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal.89 Such reasoning would not
apply to rulings of congressionally created intermediate appellate courts. Thus,
the Judiciary Act of 1789 raises many of the same tensions with the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory as later jurisdictional statutes. Those later stages of develop-
ment, however, are much more probative of whether the Appellate Jurisdiction
Theory "fits" with the current structure of the federal judiciary and Congress im-
plicitly relies upon it as a backdrop for jurisdictional statutes.
B. PRECEDENT UNDER THE EVARTS ACT OF 1891
The Evarts Act of 1891 laid the foundation for the modem federal judiciary,
incorporating circuit courts of appeals (later renamed U.S. courts of appeals) into
the judicial hierarchy.90 The Act established a two-track appellate system for fed-
eral cases. Under section 5, certain specified matters were directly appealable as
of right from a federal trial court (either the district court or circuit court) to the
U.S. Supreme Court, including issues relating to the trial court's jurisdiction,
prize cases, convictions for "capital or otherwise infamous crime[s]," and cases
involving treaties or any constitutional issues (including challenges to the
83. Act of Feb. 25, 1889, ch. 236, § 1, 25 Stat. 693, 693.
84. Id. Congress had previously raised the amount-in-controversy requirement for appealing a civil
case from the circuit court to the U.S. Supreme Court from $2,000 under the Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, §§ 13, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 81, 84, to $5,000, see Act of Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 315, 316.
85. Cf. Act of Feb. 16, 1875 § 3 (limiting the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction based on
the "sum or value" of the "matter in dispute").
86. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Saunders, 151 U.S. 105, 108 (1894) (dismissing a writ of error
under the 1889 Act in part because "the judgment does not exceed the sum of five thousand dollars").
87. Ch. 517, § 26 Stat. 826; see infra Section I.B.
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
89. See infra note 330.
90. Ch. 517, § 2.
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constitutionality of a treaty, federal statute, or state statute or constitutional
provision).91
Under section 6, all other final judgments from federal trial courts were appeal-
able to the newly created circuit courts of appeals.92 A circuit court of appeals
could certify questions from cases within its jurisdiction to the U.S. Supreme
Court.93 Its judgments in cases arising exclusively under diversity or alienage ju-
risdiction, as well as patent, revenue, criminal, and admiralty cases, were deemed
"final" and subject only to discretionary review in the U.S. Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari.94 Its judgments in other cases-primarily referring to civil cases
that initially arose under federal-question jurisdiction (other than patent, revenue,
or admiralty matters)-could be appealed as of right to the U.S. Supreme Court
where the amount in controversy exceeded $1,000.95 The House Judiciary
Committee report accompanying the Evarts Act confirmed that it conformed to
traditional judicial practice in the states.96
The Act's bifurcation of appellate routes was less determinate than it may ini-
tially appear. When an appeal fell solely under either section 5 or section 6, the
91. Id. § 5. A few years later, Congress also provided for direct appeals from trial courts to the U.S.
Supreme Court in prosecutions for violating orders from the Secretary of War to modify or remove
bridges or railroads that obstructed navigable waterways. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 18, 30 Stat.
1121, 1153-54; see, e.g., Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 416 (1917). The Act
designated violations of such orders to be misdemeanors. Act of March. 3, 1899, § 18. Its legislative
history does not explain why Congress established this unusual appellate mechanism, and there are no
cases under this statute in which a trial court discussed whether it was required to follow intermediate
appellate-court precedent. Congress implicitly repealed this provision in the Judges' Bill of 1925, ch.
229, 43 Stat. 936 (providing exclusive list of cases in which an appeal may be taken directly from a
district court to the U.S. Supreme Court, without including appeals under the Act of March 3, 1899),
and explicitly did so in the Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 39, 62 Stat. 869, 995 (listing
repealed statutes). See Supreme Court of the United States: Jurisdiction, FED.L JUD. CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/courts/supreme-court-united-states-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/VCS6-A48F]
(providing a detailed survey of the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction) (last visited Feb.
14, 2020).
92. Ch. 517, §6.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see, e.g., Cary Mfg. Co. v. Acme Flexible Clasp Co., 187 U.S. 427,428 (1903) (holding that a
circuit court of appeals's judgment in a criminal case was final and subject to review in the U.S.
Supreme Court only by writ of certiorari, even though the case involved a constitutional issue that could
have been appealed directly from the circuit court to the U.S. Supreme Court under section 5 of the
Evarts Act); Huguley Mfg. Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1902) (holding that a
circuit court of appeals's judgment in a diversity case was final and subject to review in the U.S.
Supreme Court only by writ of certiorari); cf. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397, 410
(1904) (holding that a challenge to the constitutionality of federal revenue laws did not qualify as a
"revenue" case for purposes of section 6's finality provision).
95. Ch. 517, § 6; see Miss. R.R. Comm'n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 335, 341 (1906); Am. Sugar
Ref. Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1901); see, e.g., N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Amato, 144 U.S.
465, 472 (1892) ("[A]s the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the present case was not made
final by § 6, and as the matter in controversy exceeds $ 1000 besides costs, the defendant had a right to a
writ of error from [the U.S. Supreme Court]."). See generally MacFadden v. United States, 213 U.S.
288, 294 (1909) (explaining that the finality of the circuit court of appeals's judgment depended upon
"the sources of jurisdiction of the trial court,"-in particular "whether the jurisdiction rest[ed] upon the
character of the parties or the nature of the case").
96. See H.R. REP. No. 51-1295, at 4 (1890).
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appellant was limited to the statutorily specified court.97 For example, an appeal
exclusively involving a constitutional issue in a case arising solely under federal-
question jurisdiction could only be brought in the U.S. Supreme Court under sec-
tion 5.98 In cases that fell within both provisions, in contrast, the appellant could
choose whether to appeal to the circuit court (subject to the finality rules dis-
cussed above99), or instead appeal as of right directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court.0 0 Thus, when a constitutional challenge that was directly appealable to
the U.S. Supreme Court under section 5 arose in a diversity case01 or a case that
97. Gwin v. United States, 184 U.S. 669, 673-74 (1902) ("As this case does not fall within any of the
classes excepted by section five, it is clear that if any appeal will lie at all, it should have been taken to
the Circuit Court of Appeals . . . .").
98. See, e.g., Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co., 192 U.S. at 407 ("If the case, as made by the plaintiffs
Statement, had involved no other question than the constitutional validity of the act of 1898, or the
construction or application of the Constitution of the United States, [the U.S. Supreme Court] alone
would have had jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Circuit Court."); Huguley Mfg. Co., 184 U.S.
at 295 ("If the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court rests solely on the ground that the suit arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, then the jurisdiction of [the U.S. Supreme Court] is
exclusive. .. ."); accordAm. Sugar Ref. Co., 181 U.S. at 281.
99. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
100. See Huguley Mfg. Co., 184 U.S. at 295 (holding that, when a constitutional defense arises in a
diversity case, the matter may be appealed from the circuit court to either the circuit court of appeals or
the U.S. Supreme Court). When the only basis for appealing directly to the U.S. Supreme Court under
section 5 was a jurisdictional issue, the appellant could choose whether to "take his writ of error to the
Supreme Court upon the question of jurisdiction alone, or to the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the
whole case." McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 668 (1891). In other cases involving a mix of issues that fell
within sections 5 and 6-for example, a dispute over statutory interpretation as well as a constitutional
challenge to that statute-the appellant could choose whether to appeal the entire matter to the circuit
court of appeals or instead directly to the U.S. Supreme Court; either court could resolve all of the issues
in the case. Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co., 192 U.S. at 407 (holding that, where an appeal involved both
constitutional and statutory interpretation issues, "[t]he plaintiff was entitled to bring it [to the U.S.
Supreme Court] directly from the Circuit Court, or, at its election, to go to the Circuit Court of Appeals
for a review of the whole case"); see also Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499, 509 (1896) (holding
that, when the U.S. Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over a case "in which the
constitutionality of a law of the United States was drawn in question," it "has the power to dispose, not
merely of the constitutional question, but of the entire case, including all questions, whether of
jurisdiction or of merits").
A litigant could not directly appeal the trial court's ruling to both the U.S. Supreme Court under
section 5 and a circuit court of appeals under section 6, however. See Robinson v. Caldwell, 165 U.S.
359, 362 (1897) ("It was not the purpose of the judiciary act of 1891 to give a party who was defeated in
a Circuit Court of the United States the right to have the case finally determined upon its merits both in
[the U.S. Supreme Court] and in the Circuit Court of Appeals."); see also Spreckels Ref. Co., 192 U.S.
at 407 (holding that a litigant may not "prosecute a writ of error directly from the Circuit Court to [the
U.S. Supreme Court]" after previously choosing to appeal the case from the circuit court to the circuit
court of appeals).
101. See, e.g., Huguley Mfg. Co., 184 U.S. at 295; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Trs., 179 U.S. 472, 477-
78 (1900) (holding that the appellant in a case that arose solely under diversity jurisdiction could appeal
a constitutional issue to either the circuit court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court); see also Am.
Sugar Ref. Co., 181 U.S. at 282-83 (holding that a circuit court of appeals could not decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a diversity appeal pursuant to section 6 of the Evarts Act simply because it involved a
constitutional issue that fell within section 5).
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also involved a federal statutory claim,10 2 the appellant could choose whether to
proceed under section 5 or section 6.
The Evarts Act does not fit comfortably with the Appellate Jurisdiction
Theory. The theory requires a trial court to apply the precedents of other courts
that may exercise appellate jurisdiction over a case. Under the Act, however, a
trial court could not always determine whether a case fell within the jurisdiction
of the circuit court of appeals, U.S. Supreme Court, or both, until it was over and
the issues for appeal were identified. Perhaps more importantly, in many cases,
the appellant could choose which court would hear the appeal after final
judgment.103
In the years immediately after Congress enacted the Evarts Act, federal trial
courts treated circuit courts of appeals rulings as binding.104 Although most of
those cases were appealable to the circuit courts of appeals, the trial courts' opin-
ions neither mentioned nor relied on that fact. Moreover, it does not appear that
district or circuit courts ever concluded they were free to disregard circuit courts
of appeals' rulings in cases subject to section 5 of the Evarts Act, which could be
appealed as of right directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.
To the contrary, a few examples exist in which trial courts applied the same
rules of vertical stare decisis in cases that were subject to direct appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, bypassing intermediate appellate courts. Most notably, in In re
Wong Kim Ark, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
issued a writ of habeas corpus to a U.S. citizen of Chinese descent, declaring:
102. See, e.g., Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co., 192 U.S. at 407; Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50,
52-53 (1922) (holding that, where the plaintiff had alleged that a state statute violated both the U.S.
Constitution and a federal law, the district court's judgment could be appealed to the circuit court of
appeals).
103. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Stover Mfg. Co. v. Mast, Foos & Co., 89 F. 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1898) ("The court
below, in obedience to the opinion of this court in Electric Mfg. Co. v. Edison Electric Lighting Co., 18
U.S. App. 641 ... deemed itself bound to follow the earlier decision. . . ."), aff d, 177 U.S. 485 (1900);
United States v. Breese, 172 F. 765, 773 (W.D.N.C. 1909) ("Of course, the decision of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for this circuit is controlling on the court here-absolutely so."), certified questions
answered, 226 U.S. 1 (1912); United States v. Adams Exp. Co., 119 F. 240, 244 (S.D. Iowa 1902)
(recognizing that, even if "the weight of the cases in the United States courts" supports a particular
resolution to a legal issue, "[t]he pertinent question is, has the supreme court or court of appeals for this
circuit so held?"); The Saratoga, 100 F. 480, 481 (D.R.I. 1900) ("The claims of the [plaintiffs] must be
disallowed, under the rules of law stated by the circuit court of appeals of this circuit . . . ."); United
States v. Loo Way, 68 F. 475, 477 (S.D. Cal. 1895) (issuing a ruling "[c]onformably to this decision of
the supreme court of the United States, and to the decision of the circuit court of appeals of this circuit"
because the circuit court of appeals's "decision, of course, is authoritative"), aff d, 72 F. 688 (9th Cir.
1896) (per curiam); cf. Norcross v. Nathan, 99 F. 414, 416 (D. Nev. 1900) ("As no authoritative decision
has been rendered by the circuit court of appeals or by the supreme court of the United States, the
various district judges will continually be called upon to wrestle with the disputed question, and pass
judgment thereon in accordance with their own individual views."). In Stover Mfg. Co., the Seventh
Circuit added that, in considering a motion for a preliminary injunction in a patent case, the district court
was not bound by conclusions that a different circuit had reached in another case concerning the
underlying patent. 89 F. at 337.
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It is clear that these decisions,-the one rendered in the circuit court of appeals
and the other rendered in the circuit court of this district,-determining, as
they do, the identical question involved in the case at bar, are conclusive and
controlling upon this court, unless the supreme court of the United States has
directly and authoritatively, and not by way of dictum, announced and laid
down a doctrine at variance with that expounded in the cases in this circuit.0 5
Because this was a constitutional case arising under the court's federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, it was directly appealable exclusively to the U.S. Supreme
Court.1 0 6 The district court nevertheless recognized that it was bound by the rul-
ings of its circuit's intermediate appellate court.
Similarly, in Skillin v. Magnus, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of New York explained its holding by stating, "So far as the jurisdiction of the
court is concerned, while the decisions are hopelessly at variance, I am bound to
follow the ruling of our Circuit Court of Appeals . . . ."107 This jurisdictional rul-
ing was directly appealable to either the U.S. Supreme Court or the circuit court
of appeals under the Evarts Act.0 8 The district court nevertheless treated its re-
gional circuit court of appeals's ruling as binding. Though few, these examples
suggest that a district court's general duty to follow the precedent of its regional
court of appeals1 09 applied even when those courts lacked, or otherwise may have
been prevented from exercising, appellate jurisdiction over a case.
The Evarts Act was the backdrop against which Congress enacted later laws to
provide for direct appeals from three-judge trial-court panels to the U.S. Supreme
Court, culminating in the modem-day 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253 and 2284. In the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, we should presume that such subsequent juris-
dictional statutes are to be interpreted and applied consistently with judicial
practice under the Act, as preserving federal trial courts' obligation to obey inter-
mediate appellate-court precedents.
II. PRECEDENT, THREE-JUDGE TRIAL COURTS, AND DIRECT SUPREME COURT REVIEW
A close examination of the history and development of three-judge trial courts
confirms that Congress does not legislate against the backdrop of the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory. The jurisdiction and procedure of modem three-judge dis-
trict courts was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2284. A companion provision, 28
U.S.C. § 1253, provides that those courts' rulings concerning preliminary or per-
manent injunctions may be appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. These
provisions are the modem descendants of three foundational statutes that
Congress repeatedly extended and built upon throughout he Twentieth Century:
105. 71 F. 382, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1896), affd sub nom. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898).
106. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28 (1891); Wong KimArk, 169 U.S. at 652.
107. 162 F. 689, 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1907) (citing In re Baudouine, 101 F. 574 (2d Cir. 1900)).
108. Evarts Act § 5; see McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 668 (1891).
109. See supra note 104.
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* The Expedition Act of 1903, which originally governed antitrust and certain
other commerce-related enforcement actions in equity by the Government; 110
* The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, which originally governed motions for pre-
liminary injunctions against state laws on constitutional grounds;11 and
* The Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, which originally governed actions to
enforce, enjoin, or vacate Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) orders
(and superseded the Hepburn Act of 1906,112 which had applied the
Expedition Act to such cases).11 3
These statutes-as originally enacted, and as amended over the better part of a
century-are best construed as requiring three-judge trial courts to follow the prece-
dents of both their respective regional intermediate appellate courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court. Allowing three-judge trial courts to disregard intermediate appellate-
court precedents in cases directly appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court would have
led not only to inconsistent results across materially indistinguishable cases before
the same court, but sometimes even incoherent results within the same case.
Sometimes, the court with appellate jurisdiction over a matter could not even have
been determined until the end of the case because it depended on how the trial court
ruled or the parties' own post-judgment decisions. Thus, the best reading of these
laws is that appellate jurisdiction is not the sole determinant of vertical stare decisis.
A. THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS UNDER THE EXPEDITION ACT OF 1903
Barely a decade after passing the Evarts Act, Congress began creating excep-
tions to the judiciary's structure. The Expedition Act of 1903-the first statute
requiring three-judge trial courts to adjudicate certain cases based on their subject
matter-was the foundation for decades of subsequent development.
1. The Expedition Act of 1903
The Expedition Act of 1903 authorized panels of three circuit-court judges to
adjudicate certain cases.114 It was comprised of two main components: the direct
appeal provision and the three-judge panel provision. The direct appeal provision
gave the U.S. Supreme Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all suits in eq-
uity that the Government brought in circuit court15 under the Interstate
Commerce Act,1 1 6 Sherman Antitrust Act, 1 7 or other laws "having a like purpose
110. Ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, 823; see infra Section II.A.1. This provision was sometimes referred
to as the Expediting Act.
111. Ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557; see infra Section II.C.
112. Ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 584-85.
113. Ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219-21; see infra Section II.A.2.
114. Ch. 544, § 1. In discussing circuit courts, the Expedition Act was referring to the circuit courts
originally created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, rather than the circuit courts of appeals created by the
Evarts Act.
115. Id. §2.
116. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
117. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
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that hereafter may be enacted."1 8 The three-judge panel provision granted the
Attorney General discretion to certify that any such case was, "in his opinion, . . .
of general public importance."119 When the Attorney General filed such a certifi-
cate, the court was required to convene a panel of at least three circuit judges to
adjudicate the case and expedite it "in every way." 1 20 If the judges disagreed on
what judgment to enter, they were required to certify the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court "for review."1 2 1 One of the Act's supporters explained that it was
"a measure to expedite cases now pending in order that we might have the judg-
ment of the U.S. Supreme Court upon some of these problems."122
The Expedition Act is the earliest antecedent of the modem three-judge district
court statute. Over the following century, its provisions were borrowed,
expanded, and made more generally applicable.123 There is no indication in either
later statutes or their legislative histories that Congress intended to change the
Expedition Act's approach to vertical stare decisis in three-judge trial courts.
Thus, like the Evarts Act, the Expedition Act yields important insight into the
proper role of precedent in modem three-judge courts.
There are five reasons why the Expedition Act likely did not excuse three-
judge circuit-court panels from a federal trial court's general obligation to follow
precedents of its circuit court of appeals. First, the Act's direct appeal provision
was broader than its three-judge panel provision, allowing even cases heard by a
single circuit-court judge to be appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.124
As explained above, the Act authorized appeals directly from circuit courts to the
118. Expedition Act § 1.
119. Id. The statute specified that the Attorney General "may" file a certificate with the court
declaring the case to be of public importance. Id.
120. Id. The statute required the panel to be composed of "not less than three" circuit judges. Id. If
the circuit court hearing the case was comprised of fewer than three judges, then a district judge could be
appointed to the panel. Id.
121. Id. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, the three judges
who convened under the Expedition Act (as amended by the Hepburn Act, see infra Section II.A.2) to
adjudicate a constitutional challenge to an Interstate Commerce Commission order disagreed as to the
proper outcome for the case. 215 U.S. 216, 220-22 (1909). Rather than enter a judgment according to
the majority's views, the court certified the case to the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant o the Expedition
Act. Id. at 223. The Court held that it lacked Article III jurisdiction to consider the matter because,
without a judgment from the court below, it would be exercising original, rather than appellate,
jurisdiction. Id. at 224. Congress amended the Expedition Act the following year to specify that, when
the majority of judges on a three-judge panel is unable to agree on a judgment, the Chief Justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court must appoint an additional circuit judge to the panel to cast the deciding vote.
Trusts and Interstate Commerce Expediting Act Amendments of 1910, ch. 428, 36 Stat. 854.
Those amendments further specified that, if one or more of the circuit judges on a three-judge panel
became unavailable or disqualified, either the U.S. Supreme Court Justice assigned to that circuit or the
other panel members could designate a district judge as a replacement. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 61-
1416, at 1, 3 (1910) (explaining that this reform was originally suggested by Judge George Gray of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to provide a "reasonable plan of substitution in case
of sickness or disqualification").
122. 36 CONG. REC. 2153 (1903) (statement of Rep. Overstreet).
123. See infra Sections II.A.2, II.B-C.




U.S. Supreme Court in all cases in equity that the Government filed under the
specified antitrust and commerce-related statutes.125 It allowed circuit courts to
convene three-judge panels, however, only when the Attorney General certified
that a case was of "general public importance. "126
This arrangement contemplated that certain cases-those for which the
Attorney General did not file a certificate of public importance-would be heard
by a single circuit-court judge, yet directly appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
It is unlikely that Congress would have allowed a single judge to decide antitrust
and commerce-related cases free of any case law constraints other than Supreme
Court precedent. And the Expedition Act's text provides no basis for distinguish-
ing between the obligations of single judges and three-judge panels to follow
superior courts' precedents. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he Expedition
Act's direct appeal provision did not implicitly excuse circuit courts from follow-
ing otherwise applicable precedents of their respective circuit courts of appeals.
Second, the Expedition Act's direct appeal and three-judge panel provisions
applied only to cases brought by the Government.127 Antitrust and commerce-
related cases brought by private litigants,12 8 in contrast, remained subject to
appeal to the circuit court of appeals under the Evarts Act.129 It would have been
unreasonable for a trial court to apply one body of law-including appellate-court
precedents-in cases brought by private litigants but a different body of law-in
which appellate-court precedents were not binding-in identical or closely
related cases brought by the Government.
Third, similarly, the Expedition Act's direct appeal and three-judge panel pro-
visions applied only to antitrust and commerce-related cases brought by the
Government in equity, not actions at law.130 The Sherman Antitrust Act and
Interstate Commerce Act, however, authorized actions at law for damages as
well.131 It would have been impracticable for the applicability of court of appeals
precedent o depend on whether a cause of action was brought at law or in equity.
Additionally, a trial court's interpretation of statutory provisions governing sub-
stantive rights and duties should not vary based on the nature of the remedy a
plaintiff seeks.
Fourth, the Expedition Act imposed certain procedural requirements for cases
heard by three-judge circuit court panels. It required panels to give such cases
125. Id. §2.
126. Id. § 1.
127. Id. §§ 1-2.
128. See Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (creating private right of
action for antitrust violations); Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, §§ 8, 9, 16, 24 Stat. 379, 382,
384-85 (creating private right of action against common carriers who violated the Interstate Commerce
Act or orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission).
129. Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828; see, e.g., Pa. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co.,
166 F. 254, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1908) (adjudicating appeal from circuit court to circuit court of appeals in
"an action for the recovery of treble damages under ... the federal anti-trust statute" (citing Sherman
Antitrust Act § 7)).
130. Expedition Act §§ 1, 2.
131. Sherman Antitrust Act § 7; Interstate Commerce Act §§ 8, 9.
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precedence, expedite them, and schedule hearings at the "earliest practicable"
time. 12 The Act did not suggest that panels could disregard generally applicable
rules of precedent.133 Rather, the Act's specification of certain deviations from
the ordinary rules of procedure for three-judge panels implied that they should
otherwise adjudicate cases in the same way as any other circuit court matters.13 4
Finally, nothing in the Expedition Act's legislative history suggests that
Congress intended for a different body of precedent to apply to cases that were
heard by three-judge panels or directly appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The original bills, as introduced in the House and Senate, applied only to suits in
equity brought by the Government under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 135 The
House Judiciary Committee amended the measure to also apply to suits under the
Interstate Commerce Act, as well as "any other acts having a like purpose that
may be hereafter enacted."136 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill
with the same amendments the following month,13 7 and both chambers passed it
by voice vote.138
The House Judiciary Committee report accompanying the bill explains that he
Attorney General had recommended it to "speed the final decision" of antitrust
cases.1 39 A three-judge circuit court panel, the Attorney General explained, would
give cases "as full consideration before presentation to the U.S. Supreme Court as
if heard by the United States circuit court of appeals."140 This explanation,
endorsed by the House Judiciary Committee,14 1 is illuminating because it
assumes that three-judge circuit court panels would play the same role as U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Attorney General's equation of these courts pro-
vides at least some support for the notion that three-judge panels would follow
court of appeals precedent.
132. Expedition Act § 1.
133. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
134. Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230 (1993) (holding that the specification of certain
requirements implicitly excludes the existence of others); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830, 844 (2018) (applying the expressio unius canon).
135. S. 6773, 57th Cong. § 1 (as introduced, Jan. 7, 1903); H.R. 16458, 57th Cong. § 1 (as
introduced, Jan. 7, 1903).
136. H.R. 16458, 57th Cong. § 1 (as reported with amendments by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan.
9, 1903); see also 36 CONG. REC. 654 (Jan. 9, 1903) (announcing that H.R. 16458 was reported out of
committee with amendments).
137. S. 6773, 57th Cong. § 2 (as reported with amendments by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 3,
1903).
138. 36 CONG. REC. 1679 (Feb. 4, 1903) (Senate); id. at 1747 (Feb. 5, 1903) (House).
139. H.R. REP. No. 57-3020, at 1 (Jan. 9, 1903); see also 36 CONG. REC. 2153 (Feb. 13, 1903)
(describing the Expedition Act as "a measure to expedite cases now pending in order that we might have
the judgment of the Supreme Court upon some of these problems") (statement of Rep. Overstreet). The
Senate Judiciary Committee did not prepare its own report. See 36 CONG. REC. 1679 (Feb. 4, 1903)
(statement of Sen. Fairbanks).
140. H.R. REP. No. 57-3020, at 2.
141. The committee report declared, "No reason is perceived why this request of the Department of
Justice should not be complied with and at the earliest possible moment." Id. at 2.
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Consistent with the bill's title,14 2 Senator (and future Vice President) Charles
W. Fairbanks declared, "It is the purpose of the bill to expedite litigation of great
and general importance. It has no other object."1 4 3 This explanation confirms that
the bill was not intended to exempt three-judge circuit court panels from follow-
ing court of appeals precedent. Neither the House Judiciary Committee report nor
any legislators suggested that the Expedition Act would have such an effect.
2. Expansion of the Expedition Act
A week after adopting the Expedition Act, Congress passed the Elkins Act.
This new measure extended the Expedition Act to suits in equity that the
Attorney General filed on behalf of the ICC against common carriers for trans-
porting passengers or freight at less than the published rates, or for illegally dis-
criminating among customers.144
Like the Sherman Antitrust Act and Interstate Commerce Act, the Elkins Act
also permitted private plaintiffs to sue for damages through ordinary judicial
channels.145 As with the Expedition Act itself, it would have been unreasonable
to construe the Elkins Act as requiring the trial court to apply a different body of
precedent and potentially construe the statute differently, depending on the iden-
tity of the plaintiff, the relief sought, or whether the Attorney General filed a cer-
tificate of public importance.146
Three years later, in 1906, the Hepburn Act gave the ICC authority to directly
regulate interstate railroad rates for common carriers.14 7 It provided that, when a
common carrier violated an ICC order (other than an order for the payment of
money), the ICC or any injured party could sue in the circuit court for an
142. The bill's title, as amended, was:
A bill to expedite the hearing and determination of suits in equity pending or hereafter
brought under the act of July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against
unlawful restraints and monopolies," "An act to regulate commerce," approved February 4,
1887, or any other acts having a like purpose that may be hereafter enacted.
36 CONG. REC. 1679 (Feb. 4, 1903).
143. Id. (statement of Sen. Fairbanks) (emphasis added).
144. See Elkins Act, ch. 708, § 3, 32 Stat. 847, 848 (1903); H.R. REP. No. 57-3765, at 7 (Feb. 12,
1903) (explaining that he Elkins Act gave the ICC's suits "the benefit of early hearing and disposition in
the same manner as is provided for suits commenced in the name of the United States by the recent
act").
145. Elkins Act § 3.
146. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text; see also 40 CONG. REC. 1773 (1906) (statement
of Rep. Adamson) (explaining that the Expedition Act "did not apply to cases brought by the carrier, far
the more numerous class, but was limited to those brought by the Government, and as to the latter and
smaller class we left the discretion in the Attorney-General to certify to the necessity of expedition").
147. Ch. 3591, sec. 1, § 1, 34 Stat. 584, 584-85 (1906). The Act required railroads to file their rates
with the ICC. Id. sec. 2, § 6. If the ICC determined that the rates were not just and reasonable, or that a
carrier was either not abiding by those rates or engaging in unlawful discrimination, it could issue cease-
and-desist orders and establish maximum rates for that carrier. Id. secs. 2, 4, §§ 6, 15. The Act also
prohibited common carriers from transporting people for free under most circumstances and from
transporting commodities other than timber in which the carrier had an interest. Id. sec. 1, § 1.
Additionally, carriers were required to build and operate switches to join their lines to "lateral, branch
line[s] of railroad, or private side track[s]" constructed to connect with them. Id.
2020] 723
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 108:699
injunction compelling compliance.148 Either side could appeal an adverse ruling
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. 149 The Hepburn Act separately extended the
Expedition Act's three-judge panel and direct appeal provisions to any suits to
enjoin, set aside, or enforce ICC "order[s] or requirement[s].""'o The Act speci-
fied that the Attorney General was required to file a certificate of public interest
in such cases, to ensure that a three-judge panel would hear any trial-level
proceedings.5 1
Representative Esch commented that a three-judge circuit panel is "practically
an appellate court." 15 2 Representative Townsend explained that the Hepburn Act
"permits three judges to pass upon a question instead of one, and their judgment
will have more weight than would the opinion of a single judge and more cases
will end with a decision of the expedition court."153 A three-judge panel's judg-
ment would be less likely to carry such weight or dispositively conclude a matter
if the court were free to apply its own idiosyncratic view of the law, rather than
circuit's precedent.
Congress reenacted a modified version of the Hepburn Act as part of the Urgent
Deficiencies Act of 1913, which reaffirmed that suits for injunctive relief against
ICC orders had to be litigated before three-judge trial courts.15 4 Such cases, as well
as enforcement actions, were directly appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court.5 5
148. Id. sec. 5, § 16.
149. Id. ("From any action upon such petition an appeal shall lie by either party to the Supreme Court
of the United States .. . .").
150. Id. (providing that the Expedition Act shall apply to any suits "to enjoin, set aside, annul, or
suspend" any ICC order, "including the hearing on an application for a preliminary injunction," as well as
"any proceeding in equity to enforce any order or requirement of the Commission" or any provision of the
Interstate Commerce Act); see also 51 CONG. REC. 2007 (1906) (statement of Rep. Esch) ("[T]he
provisions of the expediting act under the Sherman trust law are made applicable to the proceedings . . . .").
151. Hepburn Act, sec. 5, § 16 ("It shall be the duty of the Attorney General in every such case to file
the certificate provided for in said expediting Act ... as necessary to the application of the provisions
thereof. . .. ").
152. 51 CONG. REC. 2007 (1906) (statement of Rep. Esch).
153. Id. at 1769 (statement of Rep. Townsend). He explained that he court would have to determine
whether the ICC's order was "confiscatory" or "impose[d] a rate which [did] not yield a fair return upon
the carrier's investment." Id.
154. Ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 220-21 (providing that any "interlocutory injunction" against an ICC order
must be issued by a three-judge district court, and that the "same requirement as to judges" applied to
the "final hearing of any suit brought to suspend or set aside" such orders). For a brief stint, from 1910
through 1913, Congress had granted exclusive jurisdiction over nearly all litigation relating to ICC
orders to a short-lived Commerce Court, with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Mann-Elkins
Act, ch. 309, §§ 1-3, 36 Stat. 539, 539-43 (1910); see George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce
Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 238, 239 (1964). The Urgent
Deficiencies Act of 1913 transferred that power to three-judge district courts. 38 Stat. at 219-21.
Congress could not return jurisdiction over ICC-related matters to circuit courts because it had abolished
them in 1911, when it established the federal judiciary's current three-tier structure. See Judicial Code of
1911, ch. 231, §§ 1, 24, 289-91, 36 Stat. 1087, 1087, 1091, 1167.
155. Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, 38 Stat. at 219-20 (providing that the "right of appeal" in a
suit to "enforce, suspend, or set aside" any ICC order "shall be the same as the right of appeal heretofore
prevailing under existing law from the Commerce Court," and that the grant or denial of an interlocutory
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Over the decades that followed,15 6 Congress extended these requirements for ICC
orders to certain suits to enforce or set aside actions of various other administra-
tive agencies and officials, 15 7 including the U.S. Maritime Commission under the
Shipping Act of 1916,158 as amended by the Intercoastal Shipping Act of 1933;159
the Federal Power Commission under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920;160
the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921161 and
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930; 162 and certain orders of the
Federal Communication Commission under the Communications Act of 1934.163
The legislative histories of these provisions did not address whether three-judge
district courts adjudicating such cases must recognize their regional circuit courts
of appeals' precedents as binding.
B. DIRECT APPEALS IN CERTAIN CRIMINAL CASES
In 1907, Congress enacted the Criminal Appeals Act. 164 The statute authorized
the Government to take a writ of error in criminal cases directly from the trial
court (either a federal district court or circuit court) to the U.S. Supreme Court
when the trial court quashed one or more counts in an indictment, set aside a con-
viction based on defects in the indictment, or sustained a special plea in bar
before jeopardy attached.165 The Government previously lacked any right of
injunction against an ICC order, as well as the court's final judgment in such cases, "may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court").
156. In 1910, Congress made technical amendments to the Expedition Act. Trusts and Interstate
Commerce Expediting Act Amendments of 1910, ch. 428, § 1, 36 Stat. 854, 854. This law authorized the
appointment of substitute members for three-judge panels and provided a procedure for resolving
disputes among panel members. Id.; see supra note 121; H.R. REP. No.61-1416, at 1-2 (1910).
157. See S. REP. No. 81-2618, at 3 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 81-2122, at 3 (1950), as reprinted in 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4303.
158. Ch. 451, § 31, 39 Stat. 728, 738 (requiring the "venue and procedure" in suits to enforce, enjoin,
or vacate Shipping Board orders to be the same as for ICC orders).
159. Ch. 199, § 5, 47 Stat. 1425, 1427 (specifying that the Shipping Act continues to apply to
common carriers by water in intercoastal commerce").
160. Ch. 285, § 20, 41 Stat. 1063, 1074 (stating that parties subject o regulation under section 20 of
the act "shall have the same rights of hearing, defense, and review" as companies under the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887); see Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 179 F.2d 179, 185
n.10 (3d Cir. 1949) (recognizing that the Federal Water Power Act made the Federal Power
Commission's orders reviewable "by a three-judge district court under the Urgent Deficiencies Act").
Congress transferred jurisdiction to review Federal Power Commission orders to the courts of appeals in
1935. See Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 313(b), 49 Stat. 803, 860; see also Safe Harbor
Water Power Corp., 179 F.2d at 185 n.10.
161. Ch. 64, § 316, 42 Stat. 159, 168 (providing that all laws related to enjoining or vacating ICC
orders applied to the Secretary of Agriculture's orders under this Act, as well).
162. Ch. 436, § 11, 46 Stat. 531, 535 (same).
163. Ch. 652, § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1093 (specifying that the Urgent Deficiencies Act's provisions
concerning suits to enforce, enjoin, or vacate ICC orders applied to FCC orders as well, except for
construction permits for radio stations and orders relating to radio station licenses). The
Communications Act also applied the Expedition Act to enforcement actions in equity by the
government against common carriers under Title II. Id. § 401(d).
164. Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907).
165. Id.
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appeal in criminal cases.16 When a trial court upheld an indictment or rejected a
defendant's special plea in bar, in contrast, the Evarts Act authorized the defend-
ant to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court upon conviction in capital casesl6 7 or-
following an 1897 amendment-to the circuit court of appeals upon conviction
for any other infamous crime.168
The Criminal Appeals Act is a more indirect part of the lineage of modem
three-judge district court statutes. Although it authorized direct appeals to the
U.S. Supreme Court, it did so from certain rulings of trial judges sitting alone.
When reasonably possible, however, in the absence of statutory text or statements
in the legislative history to the contrary, jurisdictional statutes should presump-
tively be read consistently with each other, as embodying a coherent set of princi-
ples such as vertical stare decisis.
Three important features of the Criminal Appeals Act suggest that it neither
implicitly applied the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory of vertical stare decisis nor
exempted trial courts from following circuit court of appeals precedent when
direct Supreme Court review was available. First, as mentioned above, the Act
allowed certain rulings from single district or circuit judges to be appealed
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.169 This statutory scheme cannot reasonably
be read as authorizing individual trial judges to adjudicate issues in criminal cases
unconstrained by any binding precedent other than Supreme Court opinions.
Second, the Act provided for direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court only for
certain issues, relating mostly to an indictment's validity. 170 In non-capital cases,
all other issues remained subject to appeal to the circuit court of appeals.17 1
Questions concerning the validity or proper construction of the statutes under
which a defendant was indicted, however, inevitably impact the merits of the
case. For example, a court's construction of an indictment may affect its jury
instructions concerning the crime's elements, as well as its view of the sufficiency
of the government's evidence. It would have been impracticable for a trial court
to apply different bodies of precedent to such inextricably intertwined issues,
depending on the court to which each was appealable.
Finally, the Act established jurisdictional asymmetries; direct appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court was available only to the Government, and only when the
166. 41 CONG. REc. 2191 (1907) (statement of Sen. Nelson); see also United States v. Sanges, 144
U.S. 310, 322-23 (1892) (holding that the Evarts Act did not grant the federal government the right to
appeal a criminal conviction).
167. Ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827-28 (1891).
168. Act of Jan. 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492. In this context, an "infamous crime" was a crime for
which imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of years was a possible sentence, regardless of
whether it was at hard labor or the length of the sentence actually imposed. In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200,
204-05 (1891); see also Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886) (recognizing that federal law
authorized imprisonment in the penitentiary only when a sentence exceeded one year or required
confinement at hard labor (citing 70 REV. STAT. §§ 5539, 5541-42 (1875))).
169. Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. at 1246.
170. Id.
171. See Act of Jan. 20, 1897, 29 Stat. at 492.
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trial court ruled in the defendant's favor on the specified issues.17 2 If the trial court
ruled against the defendant on those issues in a non-capital case, the defendant's
appeal lay with the circuit court of appeals.173 But the body of precedent a trial
court must apply when ruling on an issue cannot depend on how the court
resolves that issue or the party in whose favor it rules. Congress's creation of dif-
ferent channels for appellate review depending on how a trial court ruled strongly
suggests that appellate jurisdiction was not the determinative factor in whether in-
termediate appellate-court precedent was binding in a case.
Moreover, though examples are limited, it appears that district courts treated
their respective regional courts of appeals' precedents as binding, even in cases
that were subject to direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court under the Act. For
example, in United States v. Louisville & N. R. Co., the district court quashed an
indictment "because of the technical strictness usually required in such matters
by the rulings of the Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit." 174 Though the
Government did not appeal, the court's ruling was subject to the U.S. Supreme
Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction.175
Of course, one might develop a more detailed and nuanced version of the
Appellate Jurisdiction Theory that does not implicate these concerns. The most
natural reading of statutes such as the Criminal Appeals Act, however, is that
allowing direct Supreme Court review of trial court rulings does not impact the
body of precedent he trial court must apply.
C. THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
Although the Expedition Act was the first statute to integrate three-judge trial
courts into the structure of the modem judiciary, the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910176
is the direct predecessor of the current provisions governing three-judge district
courts.1 7 7 Starting with the Mann-Elkins Act, Congress repeatedly expanded the
jurisdiction of three-judge trial courts throughout much of the twentieth century
to encompass an ever-widening range of constitutional litigation.
1. The Response to Exparte Young
In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Ex parte Young, confirming that fed-
eral courts may enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state stat-
utes.178 Many representatives in Congress reacted with alarm at the prospect of
172. See Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. at 1246.
173. See Act of Jan. 20, 1897, 29 Stat. at 492.
174. 165 F. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky. 1908); see also United States v. Schutte, 252 F. 212, 216-17 (D.N.D.
1918) (sustaining demurrer to the indictment based on "the long-established principles of the Circuit
Court of Appeals of this circuit, and of the Supreme Court of the United States"); cf. United States v.
Doremus, 246 F. 958, 961 (W.D. Tex. 1918) (distinguishing a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit that the Government argued was "conclusive"), rev'd on other grounds, 249 U.S. 86
(1919).
175. See Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. at 1246.
176. Ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557.
177. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2284 (2012).
178. See 209 U.S. 123, 145 (1908).
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federal judges issuing ex parte temporary restraining orders against state laws,
sometimes immediately upon their enactment and potentially lasting for months.
Senator Overman went so far as to suggest that Congress strip federal courts of ju-
risdiction to enjoin state laws.179 As a less extreme compromise, Congress
adopted the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, requiring federal circuit courts to convene
three-judge panels to decide whether to issue interlocutory orders prohibiting
state officials from enforcing state statutes.8 0
Senator Overman explained:
The people and the courts of the State are more inclined to abide by the deci-
sion of three judges than they would of one subordinate inferior Federal judge
who simply upon petition or upon a hearing should tie the hands of a State offi-
cer from proceeding with the enforcement of the laws of his sovereign State.8
In a separate debate, Overman added, "I am opposed to allowing one little fed-
eral judge to stand up against the governor and the legislature and the attorney-
general of the State and say, 'This act is unconstitutional."'
18 2
Echoing these sentiments, Senator Bacon declared:
The purpose of the bill is to throw additional safeguards around the exercise of
the enormous powers claimed for the subordinate Federal courts. If these
courts are to exercise the power of stopping the operation of the laws of a State
and of punishing the officers of a State, then at least let it be done on notice
and not hastily, and let there be the judgment of three judges to decide such
questions, and not permit such dangerous power to one man.183
The Mann-Elkins Act required any application for an "interlocutory injunc-
tion" prohibiting a state official from enforcing a state law on constitutional
grounds to be "heard and determined by three judges," including at least one cir-
cuit judge or Supreme Court Justice, and two other district or circuit judges.1 84 A
single circuit or district judge could grant a temporary restraining order when
necessary to prevent irreparable harm until the three-judge panel was able to rule
on the request for interlocutory relief."s8 Courts were required to expedite the
179. 42 CONG. REC. 4846-47 (1908) (statement of Sen. Overman); see also id. at 4853 (statement of
Sen. Bacon) (arguing that federal courts "have no power to issue the injunctions at all restraining a State
officer from executing a State law" due to the Eleventh Amendment).
180. See Mann-Elkins Act § 17; see also 42 CONG. REC. 4847 (statement of Sen. Overman)
(describing "more drastic" bills that were set aside in favor of the Mann-Elkins Act).
181. 42 CONG. REC. 4847 (statement of Sen. Overman).
182. 45 CONG. REC. 7256 (1910) (statement of Sen. Overman).
183. 42 CONG. REC. 4853 (statement of Sen. Bacon).
184. Mann-Elkins Act § 17. Although the plain text of the statute might be read as requiring a three-
judge court only to grant a preliminary injunction, the U.S. Supreme Court construed it to require that
three-judge courts adjudicate such motions even when they are rejected on the merits. Ex parte Metro.
Water Co., 220 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1911).
185. Mann-Elkins Act § 17.
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proceedings, and the panel's ruling on the interlocutory injunction could be
appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.18 6
Though the Mann-Elkins Act does not expressly address the issue, it should not
be read as permitting three-judge trial-court panels to disregard intermediate
appellate-court precedent. The Act applied only to requests for interlocutory
injunctions. After a three-judge panel ruled on the motion for an interlocutory
injunction, the remainder of the case-including any request for a permanent
injunction-was tried before a single judge. He was free to reject the three-judge
panel's rulings and reach entirely different results when adjudicating the merits
and the plaintiff's request for permanent relief. 187 In many cases, that final judg-
ment could be appealed either to the U.S. Supreme Court under section 5 of the
Evarts Act or the circuit court of appeals under section 6, at the appellant's
choice.8 8 Thus, the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory would have sometimes
required the single trial judge to apply circuit court of appeals precedent while
exempting the three-judge panel from doing so. The Mann-Elkins Act should not
be construed to allow or require a court to apply different bodies of binding prece-
dent to requests for interlocutory and permanent relief in the same case. Applying
different bodies of law to such closely related issues in a case could lead to incon-
sistent, and even i coherent, results.189
Congress codified the Mann-Elkins Act as section 266 of the Judicial Code of
1911.190 The Code abolished circuit courts1 91 and transferred their original juris-
diction to district courts.192 Three-judge trial-court panels were thereafter con-
vened in district courts. As the House debated the final version of the Judicial
186. Id.
187. See Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., 271 U.S. 131, 136 (1926); see also Stratton v. St. Louis Sw.
Ry. Co., 282 U.S. 10, 14 (1930) (discussing the "anomalous situation" under the Mann-Elkins Act "in
which a single judge might reconsider and decide questions already passed upon by three judges on the
application for an interlocutory injunction"); Smith v. Wilson, 273 U.S. 388, 390 (1927) (explaining
that, under the Mann-Elkins Act, "the final hearing might be had before a single district judge who
might arrive at a different conclusion from that reached on the preliminary hearing by the three judges");
cf. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212, 217 (1922) (holding that a
single judge may not grant a temporary restraining order modifying or otherwise disturbing a three-
judge panel's ruling about whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction).
188. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258
U.S. 50, 52-53 (1922); see also Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461, 464-65 (1926); McMillan Contracting
Co. v. Abernathy, 263 U.S. 438, 442 (1924).
189. See Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REv. 457, 477-78 (2018) (discussing the potential for
"contradictory results" if different standards for preliminary and permanent relief are applied in a case).
190. Ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162-63. During the debates over codification, the House passed
an amendment that eliminated federal courts' authority to enjoin state officials. 46 CONG. REC. 4003
(1911) (statement of Rep. Moon). The Senate instead substituted an amendment reenacting a slightly
modified version of the Mann-Elkins Act's three-judge court and direct appeal provisions, transferring
responsibility for convening three-judge panels from circuit courts (which were abolished) to the district
courts. See id.
191. Judicial Code of 1911 § 289.
192. Id. § 24(1)(a), (14) (granting district courts original jurisdiction over cases at law or in equity
arising under the U.S. Constitution in which the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000, as well as suits
against persons acting under color of state law for violating constitutional rights with no amount-in-
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Code, several representatives, pointing to the power of single district judges to
grant temporary restraining orders, expressed concern that "an unconscionable
litigant can go into court and swear irreparable injury will occur and hang up a
matter, suspend it for an indefinite time, until they can get three judges to-
gether."1 93 Such concerns would have been exacerbated, of course, if those lone
judges could have enjoined state laws, even temporarily, without abiding by the
constraints of circuit precedent.194
2. Expansion to State Agencies
In 1913, Congress broadened the Mann-Elkins Act to also require three-judge
district courts to adjudicate requests for preliminary injunctions to prohibit state
officials from enforcing or executing a state administrative agency's orders on
constitutional grounds.195 This amendment was intended to accord state railroad
commissions' orders the same procedural protections against rash or ill-consid-
ered injunctions as Congress had created for state statutes.196 The House
Judiciary Report accompanying the measure explained, "This legislation is
demanded because a few judges have sometimes hastily or improvidently issued
interlocutory injunctions suspending the enforcement of a State statute or an
order made by a State railroad commission . . . ."197 Federal courts had "held up
or prevented" enforcement of state administrative orders "for an unjustifiably
controversy requirement); see also id. § 291 (stating that all statutory delegations of powers or duties to
circuit courts now refer instead to district courts).
193. 46 CONG. REC. 4005 (1911) (statement of Rep. Cullop); see also id. at 4005 (statement of Rep.
Sherley) ("[Y]ou can now get a temporary restraining order by one judge, but you can not get it set aside
until you get three judges together .... ); id. at 4006 (statement of Rep. Carlin) ("Is not this a fact, that
one judge may now grant this interlocutory order, and that it takes three judges to set it aside?").
Representative Moon responded by claiming that the Mann-Elkins Act had "been in operation for over a
year, and such a thing has never occurred .... and, in my judgment, it never will." Id. (statement of Rep.
Moon).
194. For a discussion of how various courts have interpreted and applied the requirements for
injunctive relief differently, see Morley, supra note 189, at 486-90.
195. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013. This law further specified that when a state court
enjoined a state law or administrative order, any constitutional challenges to that provision in federal
court must be stayed until the state suit was resolved. Id. Representative Clayton explained that
Congress should allow state courts to adjudicate such challenges because "[t]he State courts are as
competent and as honest as the Federal courts, and these State courts can and will do justice by railroads
as they do by other corporations and by the people." 49 CONG. REC. 4774 (1913) (statement of Rep.
Clayton). This provision was used infrequently. See Barnds, supra note 28, at 164; Welch Pogue, State
Determination of State Law and the Judicial Code, 41 HARV. L. REv. 623, 628 (1928) (explaining that
state courts did not take advantage of their power to adjudicate constitutional challenges to state agency
orders).
Read literally, the 1913 amendment required a three-judge court to adjudicate challenges to state
administrative orders only if the plaintiff alleged that the underlying statute authorizing the order, rather
than only the order itself, was unconstitutional. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, 37 Stat. at 1013. The U.S. Supreme
Court construed this provision more broadly, however, as including any constitutional challenges to
state officials' enforcement of such orders. Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 292 (1923).
196. See 49 CONG. REC. 4773 (1913) (statement of Rep. Clayton).
197. H.R. REP. No. 62-1584, at 1 (1913).
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long time."198 The report added that the bill "correct[s] grave abuses by Federal
judges in issuing interlocutory injunctions restraining State railroad commissions
from executing [their] orders" and "prevent[s] ... interference with State
officials."199
Representative Clayton elaborated that railroad representatives had boasted
about obtaining a "sweeping injunction" against an order of the South Dakota
railroad commission setting maximum passenger ates "within 15 minutes" after
the legislature passed the law authorizing it.20 0 The injunction remained in effect
for six years.20 1 Clayton emphasized that the amendment required courts to hear
such cases "speedily."20 2 Representative Mann further noted that the amendment
was a response to the judiciary's unexpectedly narrow construction f the Mann-
Elkins Act, which Congress had intended to apply to constitutional challenges to
railroad commissions' orders.203 Even following this amendment's expansion of
the Mann-Elkins Act, the structural and practical considerations discussed
above20 4 continued to suggest that hree-judge trial-court panels were bound to
apply intermediate appellate-court precedent.
Although few cases expressly address the issue, examples persist in this period
of district courts treating U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals precedents as binding in
cases that were subject to direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. In United
States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, for example, the relator was being removed (extra-
dited) from Iowa to Ohio to be tried for federal offenses.205 He sought a writ of
habeas corpus to block his removal, arguing that the commissioner at his removal
hearing had violated his constitutional rights by refusing to consider evidence
that he was actually innocent of the charged crimes.206
The district court rejected his petition, holding that the issue had been "very
definitely disposed of by the Circuit Court of Appeals" in an earlier precedent.207
The district court emphasized, "It is my duty to follow this last announcement of
the Court of Appeals of this circuit. "208 Because the petition involved constitu-
tional issues, the relator appealed the case directly to the U.S. Supreme Court
under section 5 of the Evarts Act, as recodified in the Judicial Code of 1911.209
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1-2.
200. 49 CONG. REC. 4773 (1913) (statement of Rep. Clayton); accord H.R. REP. No. 62-1584, at 1;
49 CONG. REC. 4774 (1913) (statement of Rep. Burke).
201. 49 CONG. REC. 4773 (statement of Rep. Clayton).
202. Id. (statement of Rep. Clayton).
203. Id. at 4774 (statement of Rep. Mann).
204. See supra Section II.C.1.
205. 271 U.S. 142, 148-49 (1926), aff g 13 F.2d 225 (S.D. Iowa 1925).
206. Id.
207. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 13 F.2d 225, 226 (S.D. Iowa 1925) (citing Looney v.
Romero, 2 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1924)), aff d, 271 U.S. 142 (1926).
208. Id.
209. See Hughes, 271 U.S. at 149. Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case in 1926, it
emphasized that the relator had appealed under section 238 of the Judicial Code of 1911, before the
amendments in the Judges' Bill of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 938, took effect. Hughes, 271 U.S. at 149;
see also infra Section II.C.3 (discussing the Judges' Bill).
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Although the regional circuit court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the case,
the district court nevertheless recognized its "duty" to follow that court's
211precedents.21
3. Expansion to Permanent Injunctions
In 1925, Congress enacted the Judges' Bill, 2 1 1 transferring most of the U.S.
Supreme Court's remaining mandatory appellate jurisdiction to the circuit courts
of appeals and making the Court's docket primarily discretionary.2 12 In particular,
it gave circuit courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from district
courts in most constitutional issues,213 eliminating the direct Supreme Court
review established by section 5 of the Evarts Act. The Judges' Bill preserved
direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court214 only from interlocutory and final
judgments and decrees as authorized by the Expedition Act,215 Criminal Appeals
Act, 2 16 section 266 of the Judicial Code2 1 7 (the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,218 as
amended in 1913,219 concerning preliminary injunctions against state laws and
administrative orders on constitutional grounds), the Urgent Deficiencies Act of
1913220 (superseding the Hepburn Act of 1906,221 concerning actions to enforce
or set aside ICC orders), and the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921222 (concern-
ing certain orders of the Secretary of Agriculture).
At Senator Cummins's recommendation, the bill was amended to extend sec-
tion 266 so that, in cases where a plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction against
a state law or administrative order on constitutional grounds, a three-judge district
court panel was required to not only adjudicate that request, but render the final
judgment.2 23 The amendment authorized irect appeals to the U.S. Supreme
Court at both stages, as well.224 Cummins declared, "It is an anomaly to require
the presence of a circuit judge and two district judges to hear an application for a
preliminary injunction and then allow a single district judge to pass upon the case
finally." 225 The legislative history does not appear to contain any further discus-
sion of this amendment.
210. Hughes, 13 F.2d at 226.
211. Ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
212. 66 CONG. REc. 2752 (1925) (statement of Sen. Cummins).
213. Judges' Bill, § 128(a); see also id. § 238.
214. See id.§ 238.
215. Ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, 823 (1903); see supra Section II.A.
216. Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907); see supra Section II.B.
217. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 266, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162-63; see supra Sections II.C.1-II.C.2.
218. Ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557.
219. Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013, 1014.
220. Ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219-20; see supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
221. Ch. 3591, sec. 5, § 16, 34 Stat. 584, 592.
222. Ch. 64, § 316, 42 Stat. 159, 168; see supra Section II.A.2.
223. See 66 CONG. REC. 2917 (1925) (statement of Sen. Cummins); Judges' Bill, ch. 229, § 238, 43
Stat. 936, 938 (1925).
224. Judges' Bill, § 238.
225. 66 CONG. REc. 2917 (statement of Sen. Cummins).
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Although Cummins's amendment rectified some of the Mann-Elkins Act's
anomalies, it created several new ones, further suggesting that three-judge courts
were bound by circuit precedent. For example, the Act still required a three-judge
court to be convened and provided for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
only when a plaintiff moved for an interlocutory injunction. When a plaintiff
sought only a permanent injunction against a state law on constitutional grounds
without requesting interim relief, its case was heard by a single judge and, under
the Judges' Bill of 1925, appealable to the circuit court of appeals.226 It would
have been unreasonable for a district court to apply different bodies of law to a
case depending exclusively on whether the plaintiff requested interlocutory relief.
Such an approach could have led to conflicting rulings from the same court con-
cerning the validity of the same statute, causing unnecessarily disparate treatment
of similarly situated litigants.
Similarly, the Mann-Elkins Act applied only when plaintiffs sought prelimi-
nary injunctions against the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state laws
specifically by state officials. When plaintiffs sought such interim relief against
local officials,2 27 or even against state officials enforcing state laws that were "not
of statewide concern,"228 the matter could only be tried by a single judge and,
under the Judges' Bill, was appealable exclusively to the circuit court of appeals.
The Mann-Elkins Act was likewise inapplicable where plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of a state official's exercise of discretion under a state statute.229
Again, such constitutional challenges that fell outside the jurisdiction of three-
judge district courts were heard by a single judge and appealable to the circuit
court of appeals. The Act should not be read as authorizing a court to apply differ-
ent bodies of precedent to the same constitutional issues, depending on whether
the challenged statute was being enforced by state or local officials or how the
statute was drafted. Thus, despite the expansion of three-judge courts' authority
under the Judges' Bill, there is no indication that Congress intended to free them
from having to follow circuit court of appeals precedent.23 0
226. Stratton v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 282 U.S. 10, 15 (1930).
227. Ex parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565, 568 (1928) ("[T]he section does not apply where, as here,
although the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the defendants are local officers and the suit
involves matters of interest only to the particular municipality or district involved."); Ex parte Pub.
Nat'l Bank of N.Y., 278 U.S. 101, 103-04 (1928).
228. Rorickv. Bd. of Comm'rs, 307 U.S. 208,212-13 (1939).
229. See Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1941); Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354,
361 (1940).
230. Congress subsequently recodified the federal judicial code again, this time as part of the
complete United States Code. Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, 44 Stat. 777, 777. Three-judge court
requirements were recodified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 28-29 (1925-1926) (antitrust provisions of the Expedition
Act of 1903); 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1925-1926) (Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, concerning litigation to
enforce or challenge ICC orders); and 28 U.S.C. § 380 (1925-1926) (Mann-Elkins Act, as amended,
concerning constitutional challenges to state laws and administrative orders); see also 7 U.S.C. § 217
(1925-1926) (Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921) (applying laws concerning challenges to ICC orders
to lawsuits to enjoin certain actions of the Secretary of Agriculture); 46 U.S.C. § 830 (applying the
Urgent Deficiencies Act's judicial review provisions concerning "venue and procedure" to cases
involving the U.S. Shipping Board's orders under the Shipping Act of 1916); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 682 (1925-
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4. Expansion to Federal Laws
Three-judge district courts reached their pinnacle as a belated response to the
U.S. Supreme Court's resistance to New Deal Era innovations.2 31 Concerned that
the federal judiciary was too readily striking down President Roosevelt's initia-
tives, Congress extended the Mann-Elkins Act232 yet again in the Judicial Reform
Act of 1937, to suits in which the plaintiffs sought preliminary or permanent
injunctions against federal statutes on constitutional grounds.233 in such cases, the
Mann-Elkins Act's three-judge court and direct appeal provisions applied to
motions for preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, as well as the court's final
judgment. A separate provision of the Judicial Reform Act also authorized any
party to appeal as of right directly to the U.S. Supreme Court whenever any federal
court-including a single-judge distirct court-held a federal statute unconstitu-
tional, regardless of whether the court had been asked to issue an injunction.2 3 4
1926) (providing for direct Supreme Court review of certain issues in criminal cases as permitted by the
Criminal Appeals Act of 1907); 28 U.S.C. § 345 (1925-1926) (providing for direct Supreme Court
review of interlocutory and final judgments in all three-judge district court cases).
Several years later, Congress granted three-judge district court panels exclusive jurisdiction over
eminent domain cases involving the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Tennessee Valley Authority
Act of 1933, ch. 32, § 25, 48 Stat. 58, 70-72. The statute allowed the TVA to condemn property it
needed by filing a petition in federal district court. Id. The court would then appoint a panel of three
commissioners to determine the amount of compensation to which the landowner was entitled. Id. Either
the landowner or the TVA could object to the commissioners' determination, and a panel of "three
Federal district judges" would be convened to resolve the issue. Id. The judges conducted a de novo
proceeding, which could include viewing the property and taking additional evidence. Id.
The TVA Act's three-judge court requirement had three unique features. First, it was optional. The
Act stated that the parties could stipulate that any objections to the commissioners' valuation would "be
heard before a lesser number of judges." Id. § 25. Litigants frequently demanded three-judge courts in
the TVA's early years. Charles J. McCarthy, Land Acquisition Policies and Proceedings in TVA-A
Study of the Role of Land Acquisition in a Regional Agency, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 46, 59 (1949). When it
later became apparent that neither side received any advantage from a three-judge panel, however,
litigants often consented to proceed before a single judge to avoid logistical difficulties. Id. Second,
whereas most other three-judge court provisions required each panel to include at least one intermediate
appellate-court judge, the TVA statute specified that all three members were to be district judges. TVA
Act § 25. Finally, whereas most other laws requiring three-judge trial courts provided for direct appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court, rulings from three-judge panels under the TVA Act were appealable to the
circuit courts of appeals, id., subject to Supreme Court review by certiorari. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 548 (1946); United States ex rel. TVA v.Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 271
(1943). Congress repealed the requirement for three-judge district courts in TVA condemnation
proceedings in 1968. TVA Property Condemnation Proceedings Act, Pub. L. No. 90-536, § 1, 82 Stat.
885, 885 (1968).
231. See 81 CONG. REC. 7381 (1937) (statement of Sen. Logan); see also S. REP. No. 75-711 app. A,
at 25, 28 (1937) (quoting Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress of the United
States (Feb. 3, 1937)).
232. By this time, the Mann-Elkins Act-formerly incorporated into the Judicial Code of 1911 as 28
U.S.C. § 266, see supra note 190-had been recodified, as amended, as part of the United States Code of
1926 as 28 U.S.C. § 380, see Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, 44 Stat. 777, 909; supra note 230.
233. Ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752-53. Rep. Sumners explained that the bill was based on "the
arrangement with reference to drawing into issue by injunction the validity of certain acts of States." 81
CONG. REC. 8703 (1937) (statement of Rep. Sumners).
234. Judicial Reform Act of 1937 § 2. This provision applied regardless of whether the district court
held the law unconstitutional on its face, or as applied. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 104 (1947).
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt had requested these measures, claiming that
conflicting lower court opinions concerning the constitutionality of federal laws
were bringing "the entire administration of justice dangerously near to disre-
pute. He explained that courts "almost automatically" issued injunctions
bringing the government's processes "to a complete stop," often "in clear viola-
tion" of traditional equitable principles.23 6 Moreover, "I[i]n the uncertain state of
the law, it is not difficult for the ingenious to devise novel reasons for attacking
the validity of new legislation or its application."23 7 Under this "[g]ovemment by
injunction[,] ... no important statute can take effect ... until it has passed through
the whole hierarchy of the courts."23 8 He warned that the judiciary was evolving
into a "slowly operating third house of the National Legislature."239
Attorney General Homer Cummings echoed these sentiments before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, where he decried "[t]he impossible situation created
by the reckless use of injunctions in restraining the operation of Federal laws."240
He explained that judges "fail[] ... to exercise care, discrimination, and self-
restraint in the use of this drastic remedy."24 1 Senator O'Mahoney agreed that
"the courts have upon occasion usurped legislative power," and the three-judge
district court requirement would "prevent" them from invalidating federal or state
laws "except in clear cases."24 2 In a floor colloquy, Representative Sumners
explained that the amendment would "expedite the final determination of these
constitutional questions by permitting an appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court from the judgment of the three-judge court."24 3
Though most of the debate focused on other aspects of the bill, no one ever
suggested that the legislation would effectively exempt three-judge district courts
from having to follow court of appeals precedent in constitutional challenges to
federal statutes. Moreover, applying the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory to the
1937 Act would have created inexplicable contradictions. Any case in which the
plaintiff sought an injunction against a federal law on constitutional grounds was
subject to the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court; no matter how that court
ruled on the merits, the matter could be appealed as of right directly to the U.S.
Supreme Court.2 " Single judges, in contrast, retained jurisdiction over all other
cases in which the constitutionality of a federal law was drawn into question,
235. S. REP. No. 75-711 app. A, at 27 (quoting Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the
Congress of the United States (Feb. 3, 1937)).




240. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong. 4 (1937) (statement of Homer Cummings, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
241. Id.
242. 81 CONG. REC. 7045 (1937) (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney).
243. Id. at 8703 (statement of Rep. Sumners).
244. Judicial Reform Act of 1937, ch. 754, § 3, 50 Stat. 751, 752-53.
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such as where a plaintiff sought only declaratory relief.245 When a single-judge
court upheld a challenged statute, its ruling was appealable only to the court of
appeals.24 6 Thus, under the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory, court of appeals prece-
dent was only potentially applicable to plaintiffs that refrained from seeking an
injunction and consequently had their cases heard by a single judge. It is difficult
to justify why the body of law governing a constitutional case would depend on
the nature of the requested relief.
More fundamentally, appellate jurisdiction in constitutional challenges adjudi-
cated by a single-judge district court depended on how the court ruled. An appeal
would be heard by the court of appeals if the district court upheld the law at issue,
and by the U.S. Supreme Court if the district court invalidated it.2 47 The
Appellate Jurisdiction Theory cannot specify which other courts' precedents a
district court must apply in a case if the path of appellate review cannot be deter-
mined until after the district court has ruled.248 Thus, it does not appear that
Congress enacted the Judicial Reform Act of 1937 against the backdrop of the
Appellate Jurisdiction Theory.
Another jurisdictional law enacted roughly contemporaneously with the
Judicial Reform Act, the Northern Pacific Railroad Land Grants Act of 1936
("Land Grants Act"), reinforced the notion that Congress did not connect the
245. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1963) (holding that a three-
judge court was not required where the plaintiff pursued only declaratory relief); see also Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 606-08 (1960) (holding that a three-judge court was not required where the
plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute while seeking judicial review of the Social
Security Administration's decision to terminate his benefits).
246. C.f. Judicial Reform Act of 1937 § 2 (allowing direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court when a
federal court ruled against the constitutionality of a federal law).
247. Id.
248. In 1942, Congress amended the procedural requirements governing three-judge district courts.
Act of Apr. 6, 1942, ch. 210, § 3, 56 Stat. 198, 199. It provided that, after a three-judge district court was
convened, a single judge may nevertheless "perform all functions," "conduct all proceedings," and enter
any orders, with several crucial exceptions. Id. § 3. A single judge could not try the case, appoint a
special master, grant or vacate a preliminary injunction, dismiss the action, or grant partial or complete
summary judgment. Id. Additionally, the full panel could review any actions taken by a single judge at
any time. Id. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts had sought these revisions "to prevent
interference with the normal work of the circuit courts of appeals resulting from" three-judge court
requirements. S. REP. No. 77-115 1, at 2 (1942) (letter from Henry P. Chandler, Dir., Admin. Office of
the U.S. Courts, to Sen. Frederick Van Nuys, Chair, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 11, 1942)).
The 1942 amendments also eliminated some of the subtle distinctions among various statutes'
requirements for the composition of three-judge panels. The Expedition Act, which governed antitrust
cases and certain cases brought under the Interstate Commerce Act, required the panel to be comprised
of either three circuit judges, or two circuit judges and a district judge. Ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823 (1903).
The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, as amended, concerning constitutional challenges to state and federal
laws, required that he panel be comprised of at least one Supreme Court Justice or circuit judge, as well
as two additional circuit or district judges. Ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557. Finally, the Urgent
Deficiencies Act of 1913, concerning enforcement of and challenges to ICC orders, required only that
the panel contain at least one circuit judge. Ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 220.
The 1942 amendments altered the Expedition Act to mirror the Urgent Deficiencies Act, mandating
only that a three-judge panel include at least one circuit judge. See Act of Apr. 6, 1942 § 1. Congress
finished eliminating the distinctions among the various statutes when it recodified the Judicial Code in
1948. See Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, § 2284, 62 Stat. 869, 968; see infra notes 262-65.
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bodies of precedent a court was required to apply in a case with the channels of appel-
late review for it.249 In the mid-1800s, Congress had granted the Northern Pacific
Railroad Company a right of way through public lands to build a railroad and tele-
graph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound.250 Over a half-century later, in 1929,
Congress passed a law prohibiting the railroad from claiming public lands that fell
within national forests or Indian Reservations and specifying that the railroad was
entitled to any compensation for those limitations that a court deemed due.251
The law directed the Attorney General to sue to remove any cloud on the gov-
emment's title to disputed lands.252 Any such litigation had to be brought in a dis-
trict court within one or more of seven specified states.253 The court's final
judgment was subject to appeal to the appropriate circuit court of appeals, and
further reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court "as in other cases."2 54 The
Attorney General sued the railroad in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington, and the court referred the case to a special master.255 The
special master issued a report recommending dismissal of certain counts and dis-
positions for various other motions and special pleas.256 The court approved the
report and referred the case back to the special master for a trial on the merits,
which was expected to lead to a second report and ensuing court order.257
A few months later, while the case was still pending, Congress passed the Land
Grants Act, declaring that any party in United States v. Northern Pacific Railway
Co. could appeal the district court's first order, as well as any order it subsequently
issued pursuant to the special master's forthcoming second report, directly to the
U.S. Supreme Court.2 58 The Act further specified that any final order that the dis-
trict court entered in the case remained subject to appeal to the circuit court of
appeals.259 The Act was pervasively inconsistent with the Appellate Jurisdiction
Theory. Congress's decision to retroactively change the route of appellate review
for the district court's first order suggests that appellate jurisdiction alone does not
249. Act of May 22, 1936, ch. 444,49 Stat. 1369, 1369-70.
250. United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317, 324-25 (1940) (citing Act of July 2, 1864, ch.
217, 13 Stat. 365).
251. Id. at 332-33 (citing Act of June 25, 1929, ch. 41, § 1, 46 Stat. 41, 41-42). The Act further
specified that any land grants which had not yet been satisfied were forfeited to the government. Act of
June 25, 1929 § 2.
252. Act of June 25, 1929 § 5.
253. These included Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, and
Oregon. Id. § 7.
254. Id. Proceedings under the act were to "expedited." Id.
255. See United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 41 F. Supp. 273, 284-85 (E.D. Wash. 1941) (quoting letter
from Robert H. Jackson, Att'y Gen., to Henry A. Wallace, Vice President of the United States).
256. Id. at 285.
257. Id.
258. Act of May 22, 1936, ch. 444, 49 Stat. 1369, 1369-70; see also Schmidt v. United States, 102
F.2d 589, 591 (9th Cir. 1939) (discussing the amendment). The law specifically identified the case by
name and docket number. Act of May 22, 1936, 49 Stat. at 1369. Both the Government and the railroad
ultimately took advantage of this provision. See United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317, 334
(1940).
259. Act of May 22, 1936, 49 Stat. at 1370 ("The right of review of any final judgment, authorized by
said Act of June 25, 1929, shall continue in force and effect.").
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determine the body of precedent that governs a case. Similarly, allowing Supreme
Court review of certain interlocutory orders while retaining the court of appeals's
jurisdiction over the final judgment could have led to inconsistent and potentially
even incoherent conclusions if that meant different bodies of precedent governed
different issues in the case. And the Act's legislative history does not suggest that
Congress intended it to affect the precedents the district court was bound to
apply.260 Thus, the Land Grants Act bolsters the conclusion that federal jurisdic-
tional statutes do not implicitly incorporate the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory.
5. Recodification
The Judicial Code of 1948 consolidated the laws concerning direct appeals from
three-judge district courts to the U.S. Supreme Court in 28 U.S.C. § 1253,261 and
recodified provisions governing three-judge courts as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 through
2284.262 According to the accompanying committee report, "[t]he only change in
existing law" under the 1948 recodification was to require a three-judge court in
challenges to state legal provisions "where [an] interlocutory injunction is not
sought."263 In fact, § 2284 also ironed out the remaining distinctions among various
statutes concerning the composition of three-judge courts and established a "uniform
method of convoking [them]."2 64 A three-judge district court panel convened under
any of the provisions that Congress had previously enacted, or subsequent laws that
invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2284's procedure, was only required to include at least one cir-
cuit judge.265 The legislative history does not suggest hat any of these modifications
were intended to affect the body of case law governing three-judge district courts.
As a result of the 1948 codification, any case in which a plaintiff sought an injunc-
tion against a federal law, state law, or state administrative order on constitutional
grounds had to be heard by a three-judge district court, with direct appeal of its rul-
ings concerning preliminary and permanent injunctions to the U.S. Supreme Court.
D. THE DECLINE OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
The role of three-judge district courts changed substantially over the second half
of the twentieth century. Congress incorporated three-judge court requirements,
with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, into the Civil Rights Act of 1964266
260. See S. REP. No. 74-2020 (1936).
261. Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 928 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1952)); see H.R.
REP. No. 80-308, app. at A106 (1947); H.R REP. No. 79-2646, app. at A103 (1946). The separate
provision of the Judiciary Reform Act of 1937 authorizing direct appeals as of right to the U.S. Supreme
Court whenever a district court held a federal law unconstitutional was codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1252. See
Judicial Code of 1948, 62 Stat. at 928.
262. Judicial Code of 1948, 62 Stat. at 968 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (1952)).
263. H.R. REP. No. 80-308, app. at A181; accord H.R. REP. No. 79-2646, app. at A172.
264. H.R. REP. No. 80-308, app. at A182; accord H.R. REP. No. 79-2646, app. at A173; cf. supra
note 248 (highlighting inconsistencies in the composition of three-judge courts).
265. 28 U.S.C. § 2284; see H.R. REP. No. 80-308, app. at A182; H.R. REP. No. 79-2646, app.
at A173-74.
266. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 206(b), 707(b), 78 Stat. 241, 245, 262 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-5(b), 2000e-6(b) (2012)).
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and Voting Rights Act of 1965.267 It adopted these provisions to expedite cases268
and ensure that lone judges in southern courts could not sabotage civil rights
plaintiffs 2 6 9 or impose racist views.270 Several judges had "refused to act" to
enforce previous civil-rights laws "in the face of convincing evidence" of dis-
crimination.2 71 Congress concluded that "three U.S. judges will produce a result
which is more likely to be correct."272 In later enactments, Congress also pre-
served three-judge districts courts' jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to
congressional and legislative districts,2 73 and granted them jurisdiction to deter-
mine the validity of certain other recent federal statutes.274
Outside of these select contexts, however, Congress eliminated three-judge
court requirements to reduce the burdens they imposed on both district courts and
the U.S. Supreme Court. Critically, as Congress repealed these requirements-
returning broad swaths of cases to the jurisdiction of individual district judges,
with review in the courts of appeals-no congressional committees or members
of Congress ever suggested that they were changing the body of law that applied.
The legislative history gives no indication that the elimination of direct Supreme
Court review subjected district judges to court of appeals precedents that they
had been previously free to disregard.
Moreover, most of the three-judge panel requirements that Congress preserved
were intended to constrain the discretion of potentially outlier district judges to
ensure they fully and vigorously enforced federal rights.275 Granting three-judge
courts the freedom to disregard otherwise-binding circuit precedent would
directly undermine that critical goal.
267. Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(a), 5, 10(c), 79 Stat. 437,438-39, 442 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§§ 10101(g), 10303(a)(5), 10304(a), 10504 (Supp. II 2015)) (relating to, respectively, litigation
concerning whether a jurisdiction has a pattern or practice of racial discrimination with regard to voting,
bailout litigation, preclearance litigation, and racial discrimination with regard to voting).
268. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 4-5 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391 (additional
views of Rep. McCulloch, et al.); 110 CONG. REC. 1535, 1679, 1685 (1964) (statements of Rep. Celler).
269. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 4-5 (additional views of Rep. McCulloch et al.) (opining that
a three-judge panel would have "a greater willingness to safeguard the individual's right to vote"); see
also 110 CONG. REC. 1535 (statement of Rep. Celler) (expressing concern over "serious inadequacies"
in civil-rights enforcement by "some judges in the South"); cf. id. at 1683 (statement of Rep. Smith)
(objecting that the measure would allow the government to obtain more favorable judges in civil rights
cases).
270. Cf 110 CONG. REC. 1682 (statement of Rep. Lindsay) (emphasizing "the moderating effect of a
three-judge court").
271. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 2, at 4 (additional views of Rep. McCulloch et al.); see also id. pt. 1,
at 19 (discussing "unwarranted elays which have occurred in the course of judicial proceedings under
the prior acts").
272. 110 CONG. REC. 1686 (statement of Rep. Lindsay); see also id. at 1689 (statement of Rep.
O'Hara) (noting that three-judge courts would "protect against he human frailty that is inherent in all
mankind").
273. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012).
274. See infra notes 381-91; cf. infra notes 394, 398 and accompanying text (discussing other
modern grants of jurisdiction to three-judge district courts).
275. See, e.g., supra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
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1. Administrative Orders Review Act (the Hobbs Act)
Congress's first step in curtailing the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts
involved judicial review of agency action. As discussed earlier, throughout the
first half of the twentieth century, Congress had repeatedly amended the Urgent
Deficiencies Act of 1913 to allow three-judge courts to review the validity of var-
ious agencies' orders, with direct review by the U.S. Supreme Court.2 76 The
Administrative Procedure Act,277 however, standardized many types of adminis-
trative proceedings and required agencies to base their actions on administrative
records, greatly reducing the need for trial courts to engage in factfinding and
generate separate records.278 Moreover, as early as the Progressive Era, Congress
had already authorized courts of appeals to directly review actions of certain
other agencies,2 79 including the Federal Trade Commission,280 Securities and
Exchange Commission,2 81 Bituminous Coal Commission,2 82 and National Labor
Relations Board.283 It had even transferred jurisdiction over challenges to the
Federal Power Commission's orders from three-judge courts to courts of appeals
in 1935.284 These provisions set attractive precedents for excluding trial courts
from the administrative-review altogether.
District courts found the Urgent Deficiencies Act's three-judge panel require-
ment burdensome.285 And the Act's direct appeal provisions clogged the U.S.
Supreme Court's docket with numerous routine appeals of agency actions that
lacked national importance.286 The Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950,
also referred to as the Hobbs Act, addressed these concerns by requiring litigants
to challenge the validity of various agencies' actions directly in the courts of
appeals.2 8 7 The statute's legislative history lacks any indication that the transition
from three-judge district court panels to review in the courts of appeals affected
the body of precedent governing judicial review of agency action. FCC
Commissioner Rosel Hyde confirmed during questioning before a subcommittee
276. See supra notes 154-55, 158-63 and accompanying text.
277. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
278. See S. REP. No. 81-2618, at 4 (1950); H.R. REP. No. 81-2122, at 4 (1950), as reprinted in 1950
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4303.
279. See S. REP. No. 81-2618, at 4; H.R. REP. No. 81-2122, at 3-4; see also 96 CONG. REc. 16,626
(1950) (statement of Sen. McCarran) (discussing existing judicial review provisions that were models
for the Hobbs Act).
280. See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 720 (1914).
281. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 9(a), 48 Stat. 74, 80-81.
282. See Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, ch. 127, § 6(b), 50 Stat. 72, 85.
283. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 10(e), 49 Stat. 449, 454-55 (1935).
284. See Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 313(b), 49 Stat. 803, 860.
285. See H.R. REP. No. 81-2122, at 2,4 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4303; S. REP. No.
81-2618, at 2 (1950); 96 CONG. REc. 16,626 (1950) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
286. H.R. REP. No. 81-2122, at 2,4; S. REP. No. 81-2618, at 2, 5.
287. Ch. 1189, § 2, 64 Stat. 1129, 1129 (1950); see also S. REP. No. 81-2618, at 2 (outlining the
purposes of the legislation); 96 CONG. REC. 16,626 (statement of Sen. McCarran) (noting that the statute
"change[d] the method of review" of certain administrative actions, from "trial de novo by a district
court before three judges" with direct appeal as of right to the U.S. Supreme Court, to "appeal to the
circuit court of appeals" with the ability to petition for certiorari).
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of the Senate Judiciary Committee that the Act "simply change[d] the method of
review and remove[d] the review [as of right] by the Supreme Court."28 8 Its only
effect was to "move [cases] one bracket higher for review instead of putting them
in the [three-judge district] court. "289
2. Antitrust Cases
Over two decades later, Congress eliminated the Expedition Act's three-judge
trial court requirements for antitrust cases,290 which had fallen into disuse.291
Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, also known as the
Tunney Act, when the United States files an antitrust suit requesting equitable
relief, the Attorney General may still file a certificate of public importance, but
the only effect is that the district judge must "expedite[]" the case's resolution.2 92
Appeals from rulings on preliminary injunctions and final judgments are pre-
sumptively heard by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, subject to review by certiorari in
the U.S. Supreme Court.293 After a notice of appeal from the district court's final
judgment is filed, however, any party may ask the district court to enter an order
"stating that immediate consideration of the appeal by the U.S. Supreme Court is
of general public importance in the administration of justice."294 When a district
court makes that determination, the Supreme Court may either resolve the appeal
itself or remand it to the court of appeals.295
Neither legislative debates concerning the Tunney Act296 nor the committee
reports accompanying it 297 claimed that it affected the body of precedent govem-
ing antitrust cases. Rather, the reports explained that the Act would give courts of
appeals the opportunity to refine the issues in antitrust cases before they reached
the U.S. Supreme Court and reduce the Court's docket.2 98 The Act would also
288. To Provide for the Review of Certain Orders: Hearing on H.R. 5487 Before the Subcomm. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 4 (1950) (statements of Rosel H. Hyde, Member, FCC, and Sen.
Kilgore, Chairman, Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary). The hearing transcript does not
specify the name of the subcommittee.
289. Id. at 3 (statements of Rosel H. Hyde, Member, FCC, and Sen. Kilgore, Chairman, Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
290. Expedition Act, ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, 823 (1903); see supra Section II.A.1.
291. H.R. REP. No. 91-1129, at 3 (1970) ("In nearly 30 years, the Department of Justice utilized the
three-judge court procedure in antitrust cases only seven times. In the last 10 years, only one antitrust
case has been tried before a three-judge court.").
292. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 4, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708-09 (1974).
293. Id. §5.
294. Id. § 5(b).
295. Id.
296. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 36,341 (1974) (statement of Rep. Heinz) ("This bill will speed up
Government and defense appeals of antitrust cases by permitting circuit court consideration.... Circuit
court review would also reduce the Supreme Court's caseload and allow that court to spend its time
dealing with only the most important cases."); see also id. at 36,344 (statement of Rep. Mayne).
297. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1463, at 10 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535; S. REP. No.
93-298, at 4 (1973).
298. S. REP. No. 93-298, at 8; accord S. REP. No. 91-1214, at 2 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1129, at 3
(1970) (lamenting that direct antitrust appeals deny the U.S. Supreme Court "the benefit of consideration
by a court of appeals" (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (Clark, J.,
concurring))); see also United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963) ("Direct appeals
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enhance antitrust litigants' opportunities to receive substantive appellate r view,
because the Court typically issued only summary dispositions for antitrust cases
directly appealed there.299
The Department of Justice noted that allowing courts of appeals to review pre-
liminary injunctions in antitrust cases was not problematic, even though final
judgments could be certified for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.300 In a
letter to the Senate, the Attorney General explained that the district court's "dis-
cretion on injunctions can be reviewed, in substantial part, separately from a
determination of the ultimate merits of the case and court of appeals review is
not, therefore inconsistent with subsequent direct Supreme Court review of the
final judgment in the event of certification."301 One reasonable inference from
this statement is that the district court would not be applying different bodies of
precedent o its interlocutory and final rulings.302
The structure of the Tunney Act confirms that Congress was not legislating against
the backdrop of the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory. If the body of precedent that gov-
erns a case depends on the court that will hear the appeal, then the identity of that
reviewing court must be known at the outset (or at least before final judgment). The
Tunney Act, however, allows litigants-after final judgment-to ask that the U.S.
Supreme Court hear the appeal directly. Indeed, even if a district court were confident
it would certify a case to the U.S. Supreme Court, it could not be assured the Court
would agree to hear the matter, rather than remanding it to the court of appeals.303
The case law a court must apply cannot be based exclusively on the channel of appel-
late review when that channel is not determined until after the case is over.
3. Further Curtailment
The Tunney Act also abolished three-judge district court requirements for
actions by the government to enforce certain commerce-related laws and the
Communications Act.3 0 4 Congress transferred jurisdiction over those matters to
single-judge district courts with appeal through the ordinary channels to the
not only place a great burden on the Court but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the Courts of
Appeals.").
299. See S. REP. No. 93-298, at 8. The House Judiciary Committee added that allowing courts of
appeals to review preliminary injunctions in antitrust cases would "possibly conserve substantial
enforcement resources and ... obviate the need for some trials." H.R. REP. No. 93-1463, at 10.
300. S. REP. No. 91-1214, at 4-5 (letter from John N. Mitchell, Att'y Gen. of the U.S., to the Vice
President).
301. Id.
302. One countervailing piece of evidence is that the Department of Justice believed that district
courts should be prohibited from certifying other interlocutory rulings in antitrust cases to courts of
appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), because "[i]t would be anomalous for the courts of appeals to
undertake interlocutory resolution of such issues when, at the end of trial, if a certificate is filed, the final
judgment would go directly to the Supreme Court." Id. at 5.
303. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1709 (1974).
304. Id. at §§ 4-5 (eliminating the Expedition Act's references to the Interstate Commerce Act); id.
§ 6 (repealing § 401(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, which required three-judge courts for
actions by the United States to enforce statutory restrictions on common carriers, as well as a provision




courts of appeals.305 Yet again, the pertinent legislative history lacks any hint that
these jurisdictional changes subjected those cases to a new body of court of
appeals precedent that three-judge district courts were previously free to treat as
merely advisory or persuasive.
The following year, Congress eliminated three-judge district court require-
ments for all remaining ICC matters, dividing responsibility between district
courts and courts of appeals. It granted single-judge district courts jurisdiction to
enforce all ICC orders and adjudicate challenges to orders for the payment of
money, fines, penalties, and forfeitures.30 6 It also granted the courts of appeals ju-
risdiction to enjoin or invalidate any other ICC orders.307
Representatives Conyers and Cohen explained that these modifications "would
modernize the cumbersome and outdated judicial machinery for review of orders
of the [ICC]."308 Conyers noted that requiring three-judge district court panels
and direct Supreme Court review tremendously burdened the judiciary.309 Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Bruce B. Wilson claimed that, because courts of
appeals would sit in three-judge panels when hearing challenges to ICC orders,
the "only change" was that "applications for [TROs] would be submitted to a
panel of the court of appeals instead of merely to one district judge."310 None of
the witnesses who testified concerning the legislation,3 11 including Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and neither of the committee reports accom-
panying it,312 suggested that transferring original jurisdiction over challenges to
ICC orders from three-judge district courts (whose rulings had been directly
305. Id. § 5.
306. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-584, §§ 1, 5, 88 Stat. 1917, 1917 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1336(a), 2321(b) (1976)).
307. Id. §§ 3-5.
308. 120 CONG. REC. 40,545 (1974) (statement of Rep. Conyers); accord id. at 40,546 (statement of
Rep. Cohen); S. REP. No. 93-500, at 1 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 93-1569, at 1, 6 (1974), as reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7025.
309. See 120 CONG. REC. 40,545-46 (statement of Rep. Conyers) (quoting study group on the
caseload of the U.S. Supreme Court); see also S. REP. No. 93-500, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 93-1569, at 2;
120 CONG. REC. 40,546 (statement of Rep. Cohen). Representative Conyers explained that, according to
D.C. Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright, the "original problems for which three-judge courts were first
conceived have been largely eliminated through other reforms," and the laws establishing their
jurisdiction "generate[] rather than lessen[] litigation." Id. (statement of Rep. Conyers).
310. Judicial Review of Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission: Hearing on S. 663
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. 9 (1973) (statement of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. of the United States);
accord S. REP. No. 93-500, at 4.
311. See generally Judicial Review of Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission: Hearing
on S. 663 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (1973) (documenting testimony of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.
of the United States; George M. Stafford, Chairman, ICC; and John M. Cleary); Judicial Review of the
Interstate Commerce Commission: Hearing on S. 663 and H.R. 785 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974) (documenting testimony of Hon. Harry Phillips, C.J.,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and George M. Stafford, Chairman, ICC).
312. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1569; S. REP. No. 93-500.
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appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court) to courts of appeals would change the ap-
plicable body of law.
Congress went even further in 1976, adopting the current version of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284.313 It transferred default responsibility for virtually all constitutional litiga-
tion-including challenges to the validity of federal and state statutes-back to
single-judge district courts. Three-judge district courts with direct Supreme Court
review were reserved exclusively for redistricting cases and claims for which
some other statute expressly requires them.3 14 Yet again, this was treated as a
purely procedural change that would conserve judicial resources without affect-
ing litigants' rights.315
Finally, the Supreme Court Case Selection Improvement Act of 1988
("Improvement Act") repealed the provision of the Judicial Reform Act of 1937
authorizing direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court whenever a district court
held a federal law unconstitutional.3 16 The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
had written to the Senate unanimously endorsing the Improvement Act, "urg[ing]
the Congress to enact it promptly."3 17 The Act's supporters consistently presented
it as a means of reducing the U.S. Supreme Court's mandatory caseload, which in
turn would alleviate the need for the Court to issue summary merits dispositions
in cases of limited public importance.318 No committee report, member of
Congress, or other supporter suggested that the bill would impact which
313. See Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1-3, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284).
314. Id.
315. See S. REP. No. 93-206, at 3-4 (1973); accord S. REP. No. 94-204, at 3-4 (1975), as reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988; see, e.g., Improvement of Judicial Machinery: Hearing on H.R. 6150 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 8 (1975) (statement of Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States); id. at 16
(statement of Rowland F. Kirks, Dir., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts). The legislative record
included a letter from Professor Charles Alan Wright contending that three-judge district courts
"administer[] shabby justice" because opportunities for fact-finding were limited and they often
pressured counsel into stipulating key facts. Id. at 177 (Letter from Professor Charles Alan Wright to
Rep. Robert F. Drinan (Oct. 9, 1974)).
316. Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 1, 102 Stat. 662, 662 (1988). For more information regarding the Judicial
Reform Act of 1937, ch. 754, § 2, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (1937), see supra note 234 and accompanying text.
317. 125 CONG. REC. 7632-33 (1979) (reprinting Letter from C.J. Warren Berger et al., to Sen.
Dennis DeConcini (June 22, 1978)).
318. H.R. REP. No. 100-660, at 5, 11-12 (1988) ("The general effect of the bill is to convert the
mandatory or obligatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to jurisdiction for review by certiorari, except
for a narrow range of cases involving decisions by three judge district courts."); S. REP. No. 100-300,
at 4 (1988); 125 CONG. REC. 7632-33 (1979) (reprinting Letter from C.J. Warren Berger et al., to Sen.
Dennis DeConcini (June 22, 1978)); see also 134 CONG. REC. 13,511 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier) ("The net effect of the proposed legislation is to convert the method of Supreme Court
review to a discretionary, certiorari approach. . . . Under the current system, it is impossible for the
Supreme Court to give its fullest consideration to the mandatory cases that it receives. The Court must
resort to summary dispositions that sometimes treat litigants in a cavalier way."); id. at 4465 (statement
of Sen. Heflin) ("Under current law, the Supreme Court devotes an inordinate amount of time deciding
these cases on the merits-not because these decisions will have a significant national impact, but
because of the statutory requirements."); 125 CONG. REC. 7647 (statement of Sen. DeConcini,
presenting a statement of Sen. Bumpers) (arguing that a ruling "by a court of appeals will help the
Supreme Court in its ultimate resolution of the issue, if it decides to grant review . . . ."); id. at 7645
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precedents district courts must apply in adjudicating constitutional cases. The
Improvement Act completed the process of granting original jurisdiction over
nearly all constitutional cases to single-judge district courts, and appellate juris-
diction to review their rulings to regional courts of appeals, subject to a few nar-
row exceptions in 28 U.S.C. § 2284 and a handful of other discrete statutes.
Thus, throughout the twentieth century, the history and evolution of three-
judge district courts has been inconsistent with the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory
of vertical stare decisis.
III. A HYBRID APPROACH TO PRECEDENT
The Hybrid Theory of vertical stare decisis draws upon the strengths of both
the Appellate Jurisdiction and Structural Theories. It provides that a court must
presumptively follow the precedents of any other court that either: (i) may exer-
cise appellate jurisdiction over a case, or (ii) is hierarchically superior within the
structure of the federal judiciary, accounting for regional and subject-matter-
based components of the structure. Clear statutory text or other persuasive indicia
of legislative intent may overcome either of these presumptions. In particular,
structural considerations, considered in context, may be sufficient to displace the
presumption that a court must follow the precedents of other tribunals with appel-
late jurisdiction over a case.3 19
Under this approach, a trial court generally must follow "higher" courts' prece-
dents, even when they lack appellate jurisdiction over a particular matter. Unlike
a pure structural theory, however, the Hybrid Theory also presumptively requires
trial courts to apply the precedents of tribunals that have appellate jurisdiction
over a matter, even if they are not structurally "superior."
A. A DEFENSE OF THE HYBRID THEORY
A hybrid approach to vertical stare decisis, incorporating both the Appellate
Jurisdiction and Structural Theories, is superior to either theory standing alone
for a variety of reasons. First, as discussed above in Part II, over a century's worth
of legislation concerning three-judge trial courts and direct Supreme Court
appeals strongly suggests that Congress has not been implicitly legislating against
the backdrop of the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory alone. From the Evarts Act of
1891 and Expedition Act of 1903 through modern statutes, the identity of the
court with appellate jurisdiction over a matter has sometimes depended upon the
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("The purpose of the bill is to give the Supreme Court greater control
over managing its docket.").
An earlier version of this Act, introduced in the late 1970s, died in the House because it included an
additional provision-omitted from the version Congress ultimately enacted-that would have
eliminated the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear any appeal relating to prayer in public schools.
See S. 450, 96th Cong. § 11 (as referred to H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 10, 1979); see also 125
CONG. REC. 7644 (adopting amendment).
319. See infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
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stage of the case,320 how the trial court ruled on an issue,321 or even the parties'
choices and actions after the trial court entered judgment.3 22 It would have been
impracticable, unreasonable, or even impossible for a trial court in such cases to
determine the body of applicable precedent based on the court that would exer-
cise jurisdiction over an appeal.
Moreover, several aws provided for direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court
only over certain issues, such as preliminary injunctions323 or the validity of
indictments.3 2 4 Applying the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory would have required
district courts to apply different bodies of precedent to different issues within the
same case, creating a risk of internally inconsistent or incoherent results.
Additionally, the same issue could fall within the jurisdiction of either a single
judge with appeal to the intermediate appellate court, or a three-judge panel with
direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, depending on ancillary considerations
such as whether the case was brought by the government or a private party,3 25
whether the plaintiff sought injunctive relief,326 and whether the defendant was a
state or local officer.327 Such procedural considerations should not affect the body
320. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (1910) (providing for three-judge district
courts and direct Supreme Court review only for preliminary injunctions); Criminal Appeals Act,
ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, 1246 (1907) (providing for direct Supreme Court review only of trial court
rulings quashing one or more counts in an indictment, setting aside a conviction based on defects in the
indictment, or sustaining a special plea in bar before jeopardy attached); see also Act of May 22, 1936,
ch. 444, 49 Stat. 1369, 1369-70 (providing for direct Supreme Court review only of certain rulings in
litigation between the United States and the Northern Pacific Railroad Company); Act of Mar. 4, 1913,
ch. 160, 37 Stat. 1013, 1013 (extending Mann-Elkins Act to motions for preliminary injunctions on
constitutional grounds against state agencies' administrative orders).
321. Judicial Reform Act of 1937, Ch. 754, § 2, 50 Stat. 751, 752 (providing for direct U.S. Supreme
Court review only when a district court held a federal law unconstitutional); Criminal Appeals Act, 34
Stat. at 1246.
322. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, §§ 4-5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708-09
(1974) (authorizing litigants in antitrust cases to ask the district court to certify its judgment to the U.S.
Supreme Court for direct review); see also supra notes 100-03, 188, and accompanying text (explaining
that the Evarts Act often allowed litigants in constitutional cases to choose whether to file their appeal
with the circuit court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court).
323. Mann-Elkins Act § 17; see also Act of Mar. 4,1913, 37 Stat. at 1013.
324. Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. at 1246.
325. Expedition Act, ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823, 823 (1903) (providing for three-judge trial courts and
direct U.S. Supreme Court review only in certain antitrust and commerce-related cases brought by the
government); see also Elkins Act, ch. 708, § 3, 32 Stat. 847, 848 (1903) (extending the Expedition Act to
certain cases in which the government sued on behalf of the ICC).
326. Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 928, 968 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281-82
(1952)) (requiring three-judge district courts, with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, when a
plaintiff sought a preliminary or permanent injunction against a federal law, or to prevent a state officer
from enforcing a state law or administrative order); Judicial Reform Act of 1937 § 3 (requiring three-
judge district courts and providing for direct Supreme Court review only where the plaintiff sought a
preliminary injunction against an allegedly unconstitutional federal law); Judges' Bill, ch. 229, 43 Stat.
936, 938 (1925) (requiring three-judge district courts and providing for direct U.S. Supreme Court
review only where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against an allegedly unconstitutional state
law or administrative order); Expedition Act § 2 (providing for direct U.S. Supreme Court review in
certain cases only when the government seeks equitable relief); see also Elkins Act § 3.
327. Judicial Code of 1948, 62 Stat. at 928, 968 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § § 1253, 1281 (1952));
Mann-Elkins Act § 17; see also Judges' Bill, 43 Stat. at 938; Act of Mar. 4, 1913, 37 Stat. at 1013.
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of substantive law that governs a case, particularly when applying different
bodies of precedent could lead to inconsistent results across cases involving mate-
rially identical issues within the same jurisdiction.
In addition, the jurisdiction of three-judge courts has not always been perfectly
co-extensive with provisions allowing for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Some statutes made rulings of individual trial-court judges directly appeal-
able to the U.S. Supreme Court.328 Only the most important issues warrant imme-
diate Supreme Court review. It is highly unlikely that Congress intended to allow
lone judges to adjudicate such matters wholly unconstrained by the intermediate
appellate-court precedents that would otherwise cabin their discretion.
It is also noteworthy that, as Congress repeatedly expanded and contracted the
availability of direct Supreme Court eview for trial-court rulings over nearly a
century, it never suggested that these jurisdictional changes affected the body of
law that trial courts must apply. Neither the sponsors of these bills, other legisla-
tors, nor the congressional committees that crafted them ever suggested that a
trial court's obligation to follow intermediate appellate-court precedent hinged
on whether the trial-court sat in three-judge panels or its rulings were directly
appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court. As far back as the turn of the century, fed-
eral trial courts themselves recognized that they were bound by intermediate
appellate-court precedent, even in cases subject to direct appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court.3 29 Overall, both Congress and the judiciary appear to have pre-
sumed that federal trial courts are bound by intermediate appellate-court prece-
dent, including in cases not subject to their appellate jurisdiction.
Second, the Hybrid Theory builds upon the Structural Theory's strengths and
justifications. As a constitutional matter, Supreme Court precedents presump-
tively bind lower federal courts by virtue of those tribunals' respective constitu-
tional designations as "supreme" and "inferior." 3 30 According to the Structural
328. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, §§ 4-5, 88 Stat. 1706, 1708-09
(1974); Criminal Appeals Act, 34 Stat. at 1246; Expedition Act § 1, 32 Stat. at 823; see also Elkins Act
§ 3, 32 Stat. at 848.
329. United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 13 F.2d 225, 226 (S.D. Iowa 1925), aff d, 271 U.S. 142
(1926); United States v. Schutte, 252 F. 212, 216-17 (D.N.D. 1918); United States v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 165 F. 936, 941 (W.D. Ky. 1908); Skillin v. Magnus, 162 F. 689, 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1907); In re Wong
Kim Ark, 71 F. 382, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1896), aff dsub nom. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898); see also supra note 104.
330. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1; see Caminker, supra note 24, at 832 ("[I]nferior
courts are 'inferior to' the Supreme Court in that the former must obey the precedents set by the latter.");
see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1176 n.115 (1992) (suggesting that Article III "may
constitute an implicit grant of power to the Supreme Court" to "bind" inferior courts "with precedents");
James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 199-200 (2007) ("This requirement of subordination to
the Supreme Court may oblige inferior tribunals to give effect to the Court's precedents .... Article I
requires inferior tribunals to respect decisions of their judicial superiors."); cf. James E. Pfander,
Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1433, 1441 (2000) ("[R]ather than emphasize the duty of inferior tribunals to obey hierarchical
precedents of their judicial superior, I suggest that the Court's supremacy gives it authority to supervise
the work of inferior federal tribunals through the exercise of its power to issue discretionary writs, such
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Theory, Congress built upon this constitutional scaffolding through the Evarts
Act331 and further refined it through the Judicial Code of 1911,332 creating a
decentralized, hierarchical court system. Based on their place within the structure
of the federal judicial system, district courts are presumptively required to follow
the rulings of their regional courts of appeals. This obligation does not arise from
courts of appeals' ability to exercise appellate jurisdiction in particular cases, but
rather from their superior place within the judicial hierarchy.333 Particular statutes
may supersede this structural obligation, requiring district courts to apply a differ-
ent body of precedent in certain cases. But merely denying regional courts of
appeals appellate jurisdiction over a matter is not, on its own, enough to over-
come this structural presumption.
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a structural explanation for vertical stare
decisis in Hutto v. Davis, declaring that courts of appeals' obligation to follow
Supreme Court precedent arises from "the hierarchy of the federal court system
created by the Constitution and Congress."33 4 The concept of "the law of
as mandamus, habeas corpus, and prohibition."); William S. Dodge, Note, Congressional Control of
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an "Essential
Role," 100 YALE L.J. 1013, 1020-21 (1991) (arguing that the constitutional designation of the U.S.
Supreme Court as "supreme" both confirms the importance of its role within the federal judicial
hierarchy and carries implications for the scope of its power).
Although it may also be argued that vertical stare decisis is an inherent implication of the "judicial
[p]ower" that Article III confers upon the federal judiciary, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, Professor John
Harrison contends that the Framers did not regard stare decisis an essential component of it. Harrison,
supra note 24, at 525 ("It is highly unlikely that when the Constitution was adopted Americans believed
that the principle of stare decisis was hard-wired into the concept of judicial power."). He points out that
"[t]he allocation of judicial authority" within states during the Founding Era "was primarily horizontal,
among different courts, rather than vertical with a clear appellate hierarchy." Id. at 521. Moreover, the
Framers accepted that civil-law courts, which did not apply principles of stare decisis, exercised judicial
power as well. Id. at 522-23 & n.62.
Professor Akhil Amar has suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court's status as "supreme" might not
require lower courts to follow its rulings. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 221 n.60 (1985). He contends
that the term instead refers to the fact that the Court is the only tribunal that the Constitution requires to
exist, for which the Constitution specifies the core of its original jurisdiction, and from which further
judicial appeals are implicitly prohibited. Id. Professor Caminker persuasively rejects this interpretation
as inconsistent with Article III's drafting history. Caminker, supra, note 24, at 829-30. Caminker
likewise discounts alternate proposed interpretations of Article III by Professors Steven Calabresi and
Kevin Rhodes, as well as Professor William Dodge. See id. at 830-31; cf. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra,
at 1180 n.139 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's designation as "supreme" implies that it is the only
court that may exercise broad geographic jurisdiction and plenary subject-matter jurisdiction); Dodge,
supra, at 1014, 1029-30 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's status as "supreme" derives from its
original jurisdiction over the most important types of cases, which have the greatest potential to lead the
nation into war).
331. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891); see supra Section I.B.
332. Ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911); see supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
334. 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam); see also United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 298 (3d
Cir. 1983) (holding that, under the "common law tradition, . . . precedents set by higher courts are
conclusive on courts lower in the judicial hierarchy").
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the Circuit"335 recognized by the Court also implies a body of law that district
courts-and perhaps other federal ctors as well-are generally required to fol-
low, regardless of technicalities concerning appellate jurisdiction. The Structural
Theory's constitutional, statutory, and common-law foundations make it an
essential component of any approach to vertical stare decisis.
Third, the Hybrid Theory also provides a robust explanation for vertical stare
decisis consistent with other modem deviations from the usual channels of appellate
review. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, rather than
regional courts of appeals, exercises appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases from
federal district courts across the nation.336 The Federal Circuit has held that, because
of this exclusive jurisdiction, district courts must follow its rulings concerning sub-
stantive patent law.337 District courts must still treat the precedents of their respec-
tive regional courts of appeals as binding for all non-patent issues that arise in patent
cases, however, despite those courts' lack of appellate jurisdiction over them.338
The Federal Circuit explained that both the "spirit" of its organic statute, as
well as the "general policy of minimizing confusion and conflicts in the federal
judicial system," suggest that district courts are bound by regional court of
appeals precedent, even when those courts lack appellate jurisdiction over a
case.3 39 Practitioners and district judges should not be required to apply "two dif-
ferent sets of law for an identical issue due to the different routes of appeal."3 40
Additionally, it is "difficult to envisage how [a] district court might ... disregard[]
the established guidance of its circuit in favor of a guess" about how the Federal
Circuit-a court that lacks an extensive body of precedent concerning the vast run
of questions that arise in litigation-might view the issue.341
Several types of district court rulings are not subject to appellate review at all.
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides that a district court order remanding a
case back to state court following removal due to lack of jurisdiction is not sub-
ject to appellate review, either by a court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme
335. E.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 95 (2014) ("[T]he Tenth
Circuit abused its discretion in effectively making the opposing view the law of the Circuit."); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988); United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689
(1960).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
337. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
338. See id. at 1574-75 ("[T]he Federal Circuit shall review procedural matters, that are not unique
to patent issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the district
court would normally lie.... Where the regional circuit court has spoken on the subject, we must apply
the law as stated." (footnotes omitted)).
339. Id. at 1573-74; see also Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1022 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that this approach arises from "policies promoting certainty in the law and
stare decisis").
340. Panduit Corp., 744 F.2d at 1574; see also In re Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc.,
739 F.2d 618, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("Dealing daily with ... procedural questions in all types of cases, a
district court cannot and should not be asked to answer them one way when the appeal on the merits will
go to the regional circuit ... and in a different way when the appeal will come to [the Federal Circuit].").
341. Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Court.342 District court rulings denying motions to dismiss for lack of plausibility
under Twombly-Iqbal,34 or denying motions for summary judgment on the
grounds that disputes of material fact exist,3" are likewise unreviewable, even af-
ter final judgment.34 5 Additionally, the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of
2006 authorizes a three-judge district court panel to determine whether
Congress's ordinary operations have been disrupted by a national catastrophe,
but does not allow for appellate review in any court, including the U.S. Supreme
Court.346
These complete prohibitions on appellate review cannot reasonably be con-
strued as authorizing district courts to adjudicate these issues entirely on their
own, unconstrained by precedent from any court. And in practice, district courts
do not claim authority to adjudicate these matters completely unconstrained by
precedent, even though such rulings are unreviewable. To the contrary, cases
such as Twombly34 7 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett34 8 presuppose that district courts
will adjudicate motions to dismiss and for summary judgment consistent with
precedent from structurally superior courts.
Conversely, even though rulings from magistrate judges349 and bankruptcy
courts350 are appealable to district courts, "the majority view is that bankruptcy
judges and magistrate judges are free to disagree with and disregard district court
precedent."3 51 This is consistent with the notion that magistrate and bankruptcy
judges are not structurally inferior to district courts. Rather, a magistrate judge is
an "adjunct" of the district court352 and the bankruptcy court is a "unit" of the dis-
trict court.353 Under a Hybrid Theory, the unusual non-hierarchical incorporation
342. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (stating that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise," unless the order was issued pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 or 1443); see Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976)
(holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), remands due to lack of jurisdiction are "not subject to
challenge").
343. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). I am grateful to Professor Russell Gold for this suggestion.
344. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
345. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 183-84 (2011) (holding that a party may not "appeal an order
denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits" because "the full record developed in court
supersedes the r cord existing at the time of the summary-judgment motion"); see also Nolfi v. Ohio Ky.
Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Ortiz also precludes our consideration of defendants'
appeal from the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss.").
346. See Pub. L. No. 109-55, § 301(2), 119 Stat. 565, 588-89 (2005) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4)(B)
(2012)).
347. 550 U.S. at 544.
348. 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986) (providing detailed guidance for trial courts to apply in
determining whether a dispute of material fact exists for summary judgment purposes).
349. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012).
350. Id. § 158(a).
351. Mead, supra note 24, at 827 & n.286 (collecting cases).
352. Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 82-83 (1982). But see Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1069 (11th Cir.
2014) (arguing that bankruptcy and magistrate judges exercise "'the judicial Power of the United
States,' despite the fact that they lack Article III protections").
353. 28 U.S.C. § 151.
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of magistrate judges and bankruptcy courts into the structure of the judicial sys-
tem, combined with the general lack of stare decisis effect for district court ul-
ings,354 supersedes the presumption that these entities must follow their
respective district courts' rulings simply because their rulings are appealable
there. Thus, when Congress adopts unconventional appellate structures, courts
tend not to apply the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory of vertical stare decisis. To
the contrary, the constitutional and statutory structure of the federal judiciary also
plays a role in determining which precedents are binding.
Finally, the Hybrid Theory best furthers the key values underlying stare deci-
sis. Fairness considerations dictate treating "like cases alike."355 Allowing three-
judge district court panels to reject circuit precedent hat district judges sitting
alone must apply allows for disparities among similarly situated rightsholders
within the same jurisdiction. Applying vertical stare decisis to court of appeals
precedent, in contrast, ensures that all litigants within a jurisdiction have their
claims adjudicated and rights enforced equally, avoiding "arbitrary, and conse-
quently unjust" disparities.35 6
The Hybrid Theory also facilitates predictability in the law.357 Every court of
appeals has issued several times more opinions, published and unpublished,3 58
than the U.S. Supreme Court.359 Appellate courts have resolved countless issues
that remain open under Supreme Court precedent. And when the Court adjudi-
cates an issue, later court of appeals rulings often clarify, refine, and apply the
Court's principles at a much more granular level. If three-judge district courts
apply their respective courts of appeals' precedents-rather than treat issues
those courts have addressed as potentially open-government officials and
other actors can more easily ascertain the legal standards they must follow, and
right-sholders can more readily determine whether their rights have been violated.
354. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011).
355. Schauer, supra note 24, at 595; cf. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv.
537, 546-47 (1982) (arguing that the principle of equality, on its own, is insufficient to drive judicial
rulings because it does not identify which factors are relevant when attempting to ensure equal
treatment).
356. Schauer, supra note 24, at 595-96; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)
(explaining that stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles").
357. See Schauer, supra note 24, at 597; Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
358. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a)(i).
359. Between June 2017 and June 2018, the regional U.S. Courts of Appeals (excluding the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) terminated 31,793 cases on the merits, for an average of 2,649
cases per jurisdiction. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.B-5 (June 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/
b-5/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/06/30 [https://perma.cc/48Y5-4ZDN]. The U.S. Supreme
Court, in contrast, issued full opinions for only 63 cases during the same time period (its 2017 Term).
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL BUSINESS
tbl.A-1 (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/datajtables/supcourt_al_0930.
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE6D-2EFG]. Therefore, ach regional court of appeals produces, on
average, over forty times more merits dispositions than the U.S. Supreme Court annually.
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Additionally, the Hybrid Theory promotes judicial economy.3 60 As then-Judge
Cardozo explained, "the labor of judges would be increased almost to the break-
ing point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could
not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by
others who had gone before him."36 1 Requiring three-judge district ourts to abide
by circuit precedent alleviates the need for them to reconsider and resolve issues
already settled by courts of appeals, allowing them to focus their efforts more pre-
cisely on the unique issues raised by the matter before them.
The Hybrid Theory likewise bolsters the legitimacy of the courts and sta-
bility of the law.362 Applying vertical stare decisis "contributes to the integ-
rity of our constitutional system of government" by "permit[ting] society to
presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the pro-
clivities of individuals."36 3 Allowing district courts to disregard court of
appeals precedent would likely undermine public confidence in their rulings.
Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
explains that departures from stare decisis amount to "an approach to tyranny
and arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandon-
ment of all the just checks upon judicial authority."36 4 For all of these rea-
sons, courts should reject a pure Appellate Jurisdiction Theory of vertical
stare decisis in favor of the Hybrid Theory.
B. APPLYING THE HYBRID THEORY TO THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
28 U.S.C. § 2284 provides the current framework for three-judge district
courts.36 5 When the judge initially assigned to a case determines-usually based
on a motion filed by the plaintiff-that a federal statute allows or requires a three-
judge court to hear it,3 66 and the matter is neither completely foreclosed by
Supreme Court precedent nor "obviously frivolous," 3 67 he or she must refer the
matter to the chief judge of the circuit. The chief judge must then appoint two
360. Cf. Caminker, supra note 26, at 36 ("One justification for an inferior court's duty to obey
superior court precedent is the desire to conserve scarce judicial resources."); Jonathan R. Macey, The
Internal and External Costs and Benefits ofStare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 93, 95 (1989).
361. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921).
362. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (holding that stare decisis "contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process"); Harrison, supra note 24, at 531, 533 n.93 ("Rules of stare decisis are
justified on the basis of their systemic effects, for example, with respect to stability in the law .... It is a
commonplace that stability and predictability are central reasons for adherence to precedent."); see also
Schauer, supra note 24, at 601-02 (debating the value of "stability for stability's sake").
363. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996)
(plurality opinion) ("Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare decisis, especially in
such sensitive political contexts .. . where partisan controversy abounds.").
364. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 378, at 350
(Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
365. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2012).
366. Id. § 2284(b)(1).




additional judges, including at least one circuit judge, to hear the case.368 Even af-
ter the three-judge panel is convened, a single judge may "conduct all proceed-
ings" in the case except for hearing a trial, ruling on a motion to grant or vacate a
preliminary or permanent injunction, appointing a special master, and entering a
final judgment.369 The panel's rulings either granting a preliminary or permanent
injunction, or denying it on the merits, may be directly appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court;37 0 most other rulings are appealable to the courts of appeals.371
Section 2284 itself requires that three-judge district courts adjudicate constitu-
tional challenges to congressional or state legislative districts.3 72 Other federal
laws that authorize or require three-judge district courts to adjudicate certain
claims often expressly incorporate section 2284's provisions by reference3 73 and,
reinforcing section 1253's jurisdictional grant, provide for direct appeals of the
courts' final judgments to the U.S. Supreme Court.374
Most modern three-judge district court requirements relate to election law. For
example, three-judge courts, with direct appeal as of right to the U.S. Supreme
Court, are required to adjudicate suits for injunctive relief brought by the
Attorney General to enforce the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,375 various provisions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),3 76 and constitutional restrictions on poll
taxes.377 Bailout litigation under section 4(a) of the VRA, as well as preclearance
litigation under section 5, likewise must be brought before three-judge courts,
with the U.S. Supreme Court exercising appellate jurisdiction.3 78 When the
Attorney General seeks a determination under the VRA that a defendant jurisdic-
tion has engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination with regard to
368. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1).
369. Id. § 2284(b)(3).
370. Id. § 1253; MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 804 (1975) (per curiam) ("[A] direct appeal will
lie to [the Supreme] Court under § 1253 from the order of a three-judge federal court denying
interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief only where such order rests upon resolution of the merits of
the constitutional claim presented below.").
371. See infra Part IV.
372. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
373. See infra notes 375-78, 381-91, 394 and accompanying text; see also infra note 400.
374. Some statutes requiring certain cases to be heard by three-judge district courts provide different
appellate mechanisms, and a few preclude appellate review altogether. See infra notes 392, 395, 399,
and accompanying text; see also infra note 400.
375. 52 U.S.C. § 10701(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. II. 2015).
376. Id. § 10504 (requiring three-judge courts to adjudicate actions by the Attorney General
challenging racial discrimination in voting rights, as well as violations of absentee ballot provisions
concerning presidential elections or bilingual voting requirements).
377. Id. § 10306(c).
378. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(a)(5), 10304(a). Section 5's preclearance requirements apply only to
covered jurisdictions, as determined by section 4(b) of the statute. Id. §§ 10303(b), 10304(a). In Shelby
County v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court held that section 4(b)'s formula for identifying covered
jurisdictions was unconstitutional. 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). As a result, section 5 is not presently in
force anywhere in the nation. A handful of jurisdictions that federal courts have found engaged in
intentional racial discrimination still remain subject to preclearance requirements under section 3(c)'s
"bail-in" provisions. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c); see Edward K. Olds, Note, More Than "Rarely Used": A
Post-Shelby Judicial Standard for Section 3Preclearance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2185, 2196-97 (2017).
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voting, either party may require that the case be heard by a three-judge court.3 79
This provision contains its own procedure for convening a three-judge panel,
however, and does not incorporate section 2284.380
Three-judge district courts also have jurisdiction over certain kinds of
campaign-finance cases. They must hear any suit to "implement or construe" the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, which governs matching public funds
in presidential elections.3 81 Such panels are governed by section 2284, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has direct appellate jurisdiction over any appeals.382 When
the FEC sues under the Act for injunctive or declaratory relief, it also has discre-
tion to demand that the matter be heard by a three-judge district court under sec-
tion 2284, with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.383 Challenges to the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (commonly known as
the McCain-Feingold Act) filed before 2007 had to be heard by a three-judge
panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, convened pursuant
to section 2284,384 with the "final decision" reviewable in the U.S. Supreme
Court.38 5 For any actions brought in 2007 or afterwards, the plaintiff may choose
whether to follow the pre-2007 procedure, or instead have the case proceed nor-
mally before a single judge and through the ordinary channels of appellate
review.3 86
Outside the context of election law, Congress requires three-judge district
courts to adjudicate certain types of constitutional cases, including challenges to:
prison conditions in which the plaintiffs seek release as a remedy, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA); 38 7 the use of statistical sampling
methods in conducting a census;388 the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA)
(facial challenges only);3 89 must-carry provisions of the Cable Television
379. 52 U.S.C. § 10101(g).
380. Id. This provision further specifies that "[a]n appeal from the final judgment of such court will
lie to the Supreme Court." Id.
381. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, sec. 801, § 9011(b)(1), 85 Stat.
497, 570 (1971) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) (2012)); see FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political
Action Comm'n, 470 U.S. 480, 484-85 (1985) (holding that § 9011(b) applies to suits to determine the
constitutionality of the Act).
382. Id. sec. 801, § 901 1(b)(2) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 901 1(b)(2)).
383. Id. sec. 801, § 9010(c) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9010(c)).
384. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(1), (a)(4), (d)(1), 116 Stat. 81, 113-14 (2002) (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30110 note).
385. Id. § 403(a)(3).
386. Id. § 403(d)(2).
387. Pub. L. No. 104-134, sec. 802(a), § 3626(a)(3)(B), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-67 (1996) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B)).
388. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998 (Census Act), Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 209(e)(1), 111 Stat. 2440, 2482
(1997); see Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999) (declining
to consider the constitutionality of using statistical sampling to conduct the census because the Census
Act prohibits its use).
389. Pub. L. No. 106-554 app. D, § 1741(a), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-351 to -352 (2000); see United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 213 (2003) (plurality opinion) (rejecting facial challenge to
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Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (CTCPCA);3 90 and the budget
sequestration provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget
Act of 1985, as amended.3 91 Each of these laws contains different provisions gov-
eming appellate review; some authorize direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court
under a narrower range of circumstances than permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1253.392
The Court generally does not construe such provisions as implicitly limiting or
repealing section 1253, however. Instead, it usually exercises direct appellate ju-
risdiction over a three-judge district court's rulings to section 1253's full
extent.39
Certain other civil suits must be heard by three-judge panels convened under
section 2284 as well, such as challenges to emergency declarations under the
Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 2006.394 Those rulings are not subject
to any appeal.395 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires a three-judge court to hear
any action by the Attorney General to prevent discrimination in places of public
accommodations or employment if the Attorney General certifies that the matter
CIPA provision requiring public libraries to install Internet filtering software to limit access to obscene
and pornographic material as a condition of receiving federal funds).
390. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 23, 106 Stat. 1460, 1500 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 555(c)(1)); see
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224-25 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of "must-
carry" provisions).
391. Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1037, 1098-99 (1985) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5))
(allowing any member of Congress to challenge the constitutionality or validity of a sequestration order,
and a member of Congress or any person adversely affected by a sequestration order to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute authorizing it, before a three-judge district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2284). Challenges under this statute must be filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Id. § 274(a)(1)-(a)(3). The U.S. Supreme Court held the original version of the sequestration statute
unconstitutional for violating separation-of-powers principles, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736
(1986), but Congress later amended it to address the Court's concerns. See Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754; see also
Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 103, 125 Stat. 240, 246 (2011); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-574 to -601.
392. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings broadly provides that "any order" of the three-judge panel is subject
to direct appeal as of right to the U.S. Supreme Court. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Act
§ 274(b). CIPA and the CTCPCA allow direct Supreme Court review of interlocutory or final judgments
holding those statutes unconstitutional. Children's Internet Protection Act, app. D § 1741(b); Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 23. The Census Act allows any final judgments
or permanent injunctions to be directly appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Census Act § 209(e)(1).
The PLRA does not contain any special provisions regarding Supreme Court review. See Prison
Litigation Reform Act, sec. 802(a), § 3626(a)(3)(B).
393. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at 187-89 (exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
section 1253 over a direct appeal after a three-judge panel affirmed the constitutionality of the
CTCPCA, even though the CTCPCA itself authorizes direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court only
when it is held unconstitutional); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 634-36 (1994) (same);
cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510, 512 (2011) (reviewing a three-judge district court's prisoner
release order under the PLRA pursuant to § 1253, even though the PLRA does not expressly authorize
direct appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court).
394. Pub. L. No. 109-55, § 301(2), 119 Stat. 565, 588-89 (2005) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4)(B)
(2012)).
395. Id. § 301(2).
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 108:699
is of "general public importance."396 Rather than rely on section 2284, the Civil
Rights Act contains its own procedure for convening the panel.3 97
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act requires a three-judge
panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to adjudicate pretrial
motions in lawsuits arising from death or serious injury due to vaccinations,
though the trials themselves must be conducted by a single judge.3 98 The Act
grants the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction to hear interloc-
utory appeals of the panel's rulings on dispositive motions concerning certain
statutory defenses; the ordinary channels of appellate review otherwise govern
such cases.3 99 Other laws requiring three-judge courts to hear certain kinds of dis-
putes have become obsolete.400
In addition to the general theoretical reasons supporting the Hybrid Theory dis-
cussed above, several other structural, practical, and legal-process considerations
396. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 206(b), 707(b), 78 Stat. 241, 245, 262 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(b),
2000e-6(b) (2012)). The Act grants litigants the right to appeal a final judgment directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Id.; see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 242-43 (1964).
397. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 206(b), 707(b).
398. Pub. L. No. 109-148, sec. 2, § 319F-3(d)(1), (e)(5), 119 Stat. 2680, 2824-26 (2005) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d)(1), (e)(5)).
399. See id. § 319F-3(e)(5), (10).
400. Congress required a three-judge district court to hear challenges to the U.S. Railway
Association's final system plan for railway services in the Northeast and Midwest. Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 209(b), 87 Stat. 985, 999-1000 (1974) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. § 719(b)(1)). Certain rulings were not subject to appeal in any other court, id.
§ 209(b), while others could be appealed as of right directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, id. § 303(d).
Rather than rely on § 2284, the statute provided that the three-judge court would be appointed by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Id. § 209(b). The U.S. Railway Association was abolished in
1987. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 4031(a)(1), 100 Stat. 1874,
1906 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)).
Similarly, a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska was required to
adjudicate constitutional challenges to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987.
Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 16(b)(1), 101 Stat. 1788, 1813-14 (1988). Any such constitutional challenges
had to be brought within one year of certain events or two years of the law's enactment, depending on
the nature of the claim. Id. § 16(a)(1)-(3). The Act specified that the panel's final judgment was directly
appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. § 16(b)(1).
Congress also required three-judge district courts convened under section 2284 to adjudicate
constitutional challenges under the Ineligibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, to joint resolutions
it enacted to enable former Senator William B. Saxbe to serve as Attorney General, Act of Dec. 10,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-178, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 697, 697; former Senator Edmund Muskie to serve as
Secretary of State, Act of May 3, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-241, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 343, 343; former Senator
Lloyd Bentsen to serve as Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Jan. 19, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-2, § (b)(2),
107 Stat. 4, 4; and former Senator Hillary Clinton to serve as Secretary of State, Act of Dec. 19, 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-455, § 1(b)(2), 122 Stat. 5036, 5036. Most of the resolutions allowed litigants to appeal
these rulings directly to the U.S. Supreme Court as of right. Pub. L. No. 93-178, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 697, 697
(Saxbe); Pub. L. No. 103-2, § (b)(3)(A), 107 Stat. at 4 (Bentsen); Pub. L. No. 110-445, § 1(b)(3)(A), 122
Stat. at 5036 (Clinton). The resolution for Senator Muskie, however, provided for direct Supreme Court
review by certiorari. Pub. L. No. 96-241, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 343, 343.
Other trial courts that sit in three-judge panels include the Court of International Trade in cases involving
either constitutional challenges or other issues with "broad or significant implications in the administration or
interpretation of the customs laws," 28 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2012); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(B), and the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in congressional reference cases, 28 U.S.C. § 2509(a). Parties are not entitled to
direct appeal as of right to the U.S. Supreme Court in these matters.
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specific to these modem three-judge court requirements confirm that such panels
are bound by court of appeals precedent. First, most basically, three-judge district
courts typically must be comprised of the judge to whom the case was originally
assigned40 1 along with two other judges, at least one of whom must be a circuit
judge, presumably of that circuit. The most reasonable implication of
Congress's decision to include a circuit judge on three-judge panels is that it
would help temper the district court's decisionmaking by ensuring conformity
with the law of the circuit, reducing the likelihood of idiosyncratic, rash, or other-
wise extreme decisions.
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires that "[a] district court of three judges" adju-
dicate the specified categories of cases.403 Congress's decision to expressly spec-
ify that the panel would be "[a] district court," rather than an ad hoc tribunal
outside the structure of the regular court system, suggests that the general
rules governing district courts-including their obligation to follow circuit
precedent-apply.4 04
Third, a hybrid interpretation best furthers the purposes underlying three-judge
court requirements. Congress required three-judge courts to hear certain types of
cases over the course of the twentieth century specifically to constrain trial courts'
discretion and prevent them from either invalidating state laws or refusing to
enforce federal civil-rights requirements through idiosyncratic reasoning.405 As
Alexander Hamilton observed in The Federalist Papers, "To avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents ... ."406 Allowing district courts to disregard court of
appeals precedent and reach their own conclusions about issues like redistricting
would frustrate these goals by giving them greater latitude to adopt outlier
interpretations.
Fourth, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that three-judge courts
typically may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims that do not inde-
pendently fall within their jurisdiction.4 07 Allowing such courts to ignore circuit
401. This will typically be a district judge, but could also be a circuit judge or Supreme Court Justice,
sitting by designation on the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 132(b).
402. Id. § 2284(b)(1). The circuit judge is selected and assigned by the "chief judge of the circuit" in
which the district court sits. Id.
403. Id. § 2284(a).
404. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rockefeller, 431 F.2d 368, 371 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that a three-judge
district court is bound by circuit precedent because it "sit[s] as a district court"); Russell v. Hathaway,
423 F. Supp. 833, 835 (N.D. Tex. 1976) ("A three-judge court is bound by apposite decisions of the
Court of Appeals for its circuit. The addition by Congress in the three-judge court acts of a second
district judge and a Circuit Judge together with direct appeal to the Supreme Court was not a grant of
authority with elevated precedential stature but a withdrawal of power from a single judge."); Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 31 F. Supp. 125, 127 (E.D. Ark. 1940) (three-judge court) ("This [three-
judge] court's jurisdiction is that of a District Court and it is bound to follow unreversed and unmodified
decision[s] by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the circuit."), aff d, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
405. See supra notes 182-83, 196-200, 236, 240-42, 269-72 and accompanying text.
406. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
407. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1970); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 80-81 (1960).
2020] 757
THE GEORGETOWN LAw JouRNAL
precedent would have ramifications for areas of law beyond the specific causes of
action Congress has authorized them to adjudicate.
Finally, practical considerations counsel strongly in favor of requiring three-
judge district courts to accept court of appeals precedent as binding. Binding
precedent narrows the scope of parties' disputes. District courts often rely on
appellate precedent to not only guide their merits determinations, but also to
determine the rules governing innumerable procedural nd ancillary issues
including personal jurisdiction, justiciability, discovery, the standards governing
dispositive motions, and evidentiary rulings. Accepting court of appeals prece-
dent as binding alleviates the need for parties to waste time and resources
attempting to persuade a three-judge district court panel to reconsider the wide
range of basic rules, procedures, and principles that typically govern the adjudica-
tion of cases in that jurisdiction. In conclusion, both the Hybrid Theory of vertical
stare decisis, as well as additional considerations pecific to three-judge district
courts, establish that such courts should treat their respective circuits' precedents
as binding.
Professor Jeffrey C. Dobbins is a proponent of the Structural Theory. He has
suggested that, when Congress creates a "nonstandard appellate process[]," the
default presumption should be that it neither "result[s] in cross-circuit binding
precedent, nor in binding precedential effect on any courts not regularly in a
direct appellate relationship."4 08 Congress may overcome this presumption if it
"clearly states its view to the contrary."40 9 Such a clear-statement approach, he
contends, makes it easier to determine which entities' rulings have binding effect
within nonstandard appellate structures, limits the potential for disuniformity
among different courts' rulings on an issue, and recognizes Congress's primacy
in authorizing departures from the ordinary rules of precedent that flow from the
Evarts Act.410
His proposal, however, does not directly resolve whether court of appeals prec-
edent is binding on three-judge district court panels. Requiring a three-judge
panel to follow the precedents of its regional court of appeals does not violate
Dobbins's recommended prohibition on "cross-circuit binding precedent."4 1 1 It is
unclear how the second part of his proposed standard applies in this context, how-
ever. He argues that a court's precedent should not have binding stare decisis
effect on other courts with which it is not "regularly in a direct appellate relation-
ship." 4 12 On the one hand, regional courts of appeals "regularly" stand "in a direct
appellate relationship" with federal district courts, suggesting their precedent
should govern three-judge district court panels.4 13 On the other hand, three-judge
district court panels themselves are, in many respects, not "regularly" subject to
408. Dobbins, supra note 24, at 1490.
409. Id.
410. See id. at 1490-94.





regional courts of appeals' appellate jurisdiction.4 14 Consequently, Professor
Dobbins's theory could arguably support either conclusion.
Professors Douglas and Solimine offer three main reasons why three-judge dis-
trict courts are not bound by circuit precedent.415 First, invoking the Appellate
Jurisdiction Theory, they argue that three-judge district courts need not follow
court of appeals precedent because many of their rulings are appealable only to
the U.S. Supreme Court.4 16 As discussed earlier, both early practice under the
Evarts Act, as well as the history and development of the modem three-judge
court statute, strongly suggest that Congress did not legislate against the backdrop
of the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory.4 17 Moreover, a Hybrid Theory both provides
a much more descriptively accurate explanation of how other unconventional
appellate structures operate and most effectively furthers the goals of stare
decisis.
Second, Professors Douglas and Solimine contend that "unnecessarily binding
three-judge district courts would take away an aspect of their independence."418
Nothing in the legislative history of three-judge courts, however, suggests that
Congress intended them to be "independent." To the contrary, one of Congress's
main reasons for authorizing three-judge courts over the course of their history
was to prevent judges from making rash, idiosyncratic, or legally unwarranted
rulings.419
Finally, they maintain that allowing three-judge district courts to disregard cir-
cuit precedent would increase the likelihood that such courts reach "correct" rul-
ings.420 There is no reason to believe, however, that three-judge district courts are
categorically more likely than three-judge court of appeals panels to identify con-
stitutionally or legally correct rules of law, regardless of the metric by which ac-
curacy is measured. To the contrary, district courts are institutionally geared
toward case processing and factfinding, whereas courts of appeals are primarily
designed to resolve complex legal issues.421 Allowing district courts to adjudicate
cases free of court of appeals precedent is unlikely to enhance the quality or accu-
racy of their rulings. Rather, to the extent their rulings are inconsistent with the
overall fabric of law within the circuit, they may well be systematically inferior.
IV. THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION THEORY AND THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS
Even if one accepts the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory of vertical stare decisis,
modem three-judge district courts convened under section 2284 should still treat
414. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). But see infra Part IV.
415. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 441.
416. Id. at 441-42 ("A circuit court cannot review the decision of a three-judge district court, so a
three-judge district court need not, as a matter of formal judicial decisionmaking, adhere to circuit
precedent.").
417. See supra Parts I-II.
418. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 444.
419. See supra notes 182-83, 196-200, 236, 240-42, 269-72 and accompanying text.
420. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 14, at 444.
421. Caminker, supra note 24, at 846.
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their courts of appeals' precedents as binding. The Appellate Jurisdiction Theory
advocated by Professors Douglas and Solimine provides that a trial court is only
required to apply the precedent of courts with appellate jurisdiction over the partic-
ular case before it (though the trial court may also choose to follow whatever per-
suasive precedents it wishes). Although federal law provides that three-judge
district courts' rulings granting or denying injunctions are appealable directly to the
U.S. Supreme Court,422 courts of appeals may nevertheless review a wide range of
other issues within such cases, many of which may directly impact the merits.423
First, three-judge district courts are required, and direct Supreme Court review
is available, only for justiciable cases.424 Before convening a three-judge panel
under section 2284, a single district judge must confirm that the plaintiff has
standing,4 2 5 its claims are ripe,4 2 6 the case is not moot,42 7 and the matter does not
involve a political question.428 If the district judge determines the case is not justi-
ciable for any of these reasons, he or she must dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction without convening a three-judge panel.4 29
Likewise, if the judge convenes a three-judge panel, and the panel itself deter-
mines the case is not justiciable, the panel must either dismiss the case, or
422. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012).
423. See generally MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 804 (1975) (per curiam) ("[A] direct appeal
will lie to [the Supreme] Court under § 1253 from the order of a three-judge federal court denying
interlocutory or permanent injunctive relief only where such order rests upon resolution of the merits of
the constitutional claim presented below.").
424. Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 100 (1974) ("A three-judge court is
not required where . .. the complaint is not justiciable in the federal courts.").
425. See, e.g., Feinberg v. FDIC, 522 F.2d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[A] single district judge
may dismiss an application for a three-judge court for lack of standing or jurisdiction without
determining the substantiality of the constitutional questions presented."); Wernick v. Matthews, 524
F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[U]pon a finding of lack of standing, a single judge could have properly
refused to convene the three-judge court and could himself have entered the order dismissing the
complaint."). Although not presently required by Supreme Court doctrine, a district court should
determine the standing of each plaintiff in the case to determine the proper scope of relief. See Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, One GoodPlaintiffIs Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 543 (2017).
426. See, e.g., Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Questions of ripeness
and standing imply jurisdictional issues and it is thus necessary that these questions be reviewed initially
by the single judge, rather than by reference to a three-judge Court.").
427. See, e.g., Gray v. Bd. of Trs., 342 U.S. 517, 518 (1952) (affirming dissolution of three-judge
district court because plaintiffs' claims had been mooted); Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United
States, 433 F.2d 212, 243 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that a three-judge court is unnecessary when the
claims within its jurisdiction are moot); Young v. Walker, 435 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (M.D. Fla. 1977)
("Where one of the essential claims that require a three-judge district court becomes moot before a
three-judge court is convened, it is obvious that one need not be convened."); see also Buchanan v.
Evans, 423 U.S. 963, 973-74 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding that a moot claim need not
be heard by a three-judge district court).
428. Cf. supra note 41 (discussing the role of three-judge courts in adjudicating the justiciability of
political gerrymandering claims).
429. See, e.g., Republican Party of La. v. FEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2015), summarily
aff d, 137 S.Ct. 2178 (2017) (mem.); Sharrow v. Peyser, 443 F. Supp. 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff d,
582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978) (mem.).
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dissolve and allow the original district judge to dismiss it.4 30 Either way, under
modem practice,431 when the district court concludes the plaintiff's claims are not
justiciable, the plaintiff must appeal to the court of appeals, rather than to the
U.S. Supreme Court.4 32
Although justiciability is distinct from the merits of a claim, it requires courts
to consider merits-related factors. For example, to assess whether the plaintiff in
any type of gerrymandering case has standing, the court must consider what ger-
rymandering precedents say about the types of redistricting-related harms that
qualify as legally cognizable.4 33 Likewise, the political question doctrine's
applicability depends, in large part, on whether the plaintiff has presented judi-
cially manageable standards for adjudicating its claim.434 Thus, at the very least,
the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory dictates that district courts must apply court of
appeals precedents concerning justiciability. Allowing district courts to later dis-
regard those precedents at the merits stage would be untenable, potentially lead-
ing to internally inconsistent or incoherent rulings within the same case.
Second, a three-judge panel may be convened, and irect appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court is available, only when a case presents a "substantial federal ques-
tion."4' As the U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Shapiro v. McManus,
a plaintiff cannot invoke a federal court's jurisdiction with an insubstantial
claim-one that is "essentially fictitious," "obviously frivolous," or "obviously
without merit. "436
When a single judge determines that a complaint invoking section 2284 does
not present a substantial federal question, he or she must dismiss it for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction without convening a three-judge panel.437 Likewise, if
430. Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 101 (1974) ("Where the three-judge
court perceives a ground justifying both dissolution and dismissal, the chronology of decisionmaking is
typically a matter of mere convenience or happenstance.").
431. Historically, if a district court did not convene a three-judge panel, or the panel dissolved, the
plaintiff's remedy was to seek a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Supreme Court ordering the lower court
to convene such a panel. See Ex parte Metro. Water Co., 220 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1911). Gonzalez
explained that the Court abandoned that approach because "only a narrow construction" of section 1253's
direct appeal requirements furthered Congress's policy "of minimizing the mandatory docket of th[e]
Court in the interests of sound judicial administration." 419 U.S. at 98; cf. Phillips v. United States, 312
U.S. 246, 251 (1941) (recognizing that three-judge court requirements are not "a measure of broad social
policy to be construed with great liberality, but ... an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term").
432. Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 101 ("[W]hen a three-judge court denies a plaintiff injunctive relief on
grounds which, if sound, would have justified dissolution of the court as to that plaintiff, or a refusal to
request the convention of a three-judge court ab initio, review of the denial is available only in the court
of appeals.").
433. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995) (discussing standing requirements
for racial gerrymandering claims); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993) (considering the
circumstances under which non-minority plaintiffs may assert racial gerrymandering claims).
434. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502-07 (2019); see, e.g., supra note 41
(discussing lower-court rulings concerning the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims).
435. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455 (2015); Exparte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31 (1933) (per
curiam).
436. 136 S. Ct. at 456 (quoting Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973)).
437. See id. at 455-56.
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a three-judge panel determines that a case does not present a substantial federal
question, it must either dismiss the case or dissolve so that a single judge may do
so.438 In cases that do not present a substantial federal question, only the court of
appeals, and not the U.S. Supreme Court, has appellate jurisdiction.43 9 If a three-
judge panel adjudicates a case that the U.S. Supreme Court deems insubstantial,
the Court will overturn its ruling and remand the matter for entry of judgment by
a single judge, to be potentially followed by an appeal to the court of appeals.4 40
As explained above, the Court has held that a claim is insubstantial if the
Court's own decisions "foreclose the subject" or the claim is "obviously without
merit."44 1 This formulation appears to recognize the possibility that a plaintiff's
claims may be "obviously without merit" even if previous decisions of the Court
itself do not "foreclose the subject." Moreover, the Court's ruling in Schneider v.
Rusk provides at least some support for the notion that court of appeals precedent
may render a plaintiff's claim insubstantial.44 2
The plaintiff in Schneider challenged the constitutionality of a federal law
stripping U.S. citizenship from any naturalized citizen who, following naturaliza-
tion, returned to live for three years in the country in which he or she was bom or
previously held citizenship.443 The district court refused to convene a three-judge
panel because it concluded the plaintiff's claim was insubstantial, noting that the
D.C. Circuit had previously upheld the constitutionality of a comparable law.44
The court of appeals affirmed, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the Court's intervening rulings relating to loss of citizenship had rendered the
challenge substantial.44 5 The Court never suggested that it was improper for the
trial court to reject a claim as insubstantial based solely on a court of appeals
precedent. To the contrary, Schneider's analysis suggests that a court of appeals
precedent could well be sufficient to eliminate the need for a three-judge court.
Thus, a district court's determination that a plaintiff's constitutional claims are
insubstantial is subject to review in the court of appeals. Although substantiality
is a jurisdictional inquiry distinct from the merits, it is closely related insofar as
the court must determine whether the plaintiff's claims are inconsistent with
438. See id.
439. See Wilson v. City of Port Lavaca, 391 U.S. 352, 352 (1968) (per curiam); see also Okla. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Okla. Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1934) ("When it becomes apparent that the
plaintiff has no case for three judges ... direct appeal [to the Supreme Court] must fail....").
440. See Gully v. Interstate Nat. Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16, 18 (1934) (per curiam) (reversing injunction
entered by three-judge district court because "[n]o substantial question was presented" and, accordingly,
"there was no occasion for constituting a court of three judges").
441. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933) (per curiam) (quoting Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933)); accord Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974); Cal. Water
Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 255 (1938) (per curiam); see also Shapiro, 136 S. Ct.
at 455-56.
442. See 372 U.S. 224, 225 (1963) (per curiam).
443. Id. at 224-25 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 352(a)(1), 66
Stat. 163, 269).




precedent. It would be untenable to require a three-judge district court to consider
court of appeals rulings to determine the substantiality of a plaintiff's claims, yet
allow the court to disregard those rulings at the merits stage.
Third, a three-judge court is likewise prohibited from adjudicating cases that
appear to fall within its jurisdiction when a plaintiff's claims are obviously meri-
torious and the challenged legal provisions are clearly unconstitutional.4 46 In such
cases, a single district judge is required to grant relief, and the resulting judgment
is directly reviewable only in the court of appeals, not the U.S. Supreme Court.7
In Bailey v. Patterson, the plaintiffs challenged state laws requiring transportation
services and facilities to be racially segregated.44 8 The district court convened a
three-judge panel, then abstained from adjudicating the case to give the state
courts an opportunity to construe the challenged provisions.4 49
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had erred in
convening a three-judge panel.450 It explained that "three judges are ... not
required when, as here, prior decisions make frivolous any claim that a state stat-
ute on its face is not unconstitutional."4 51 Because the Court had "settled beyond
question that no State may require racial segregation of interstate or intrastate
transportation facilities," the district judge should not have convened a three-
judge panel, but rather adjudicated the claim himself, with direct appeal to the
court of appeals rather than the U.S. Supreme Court.45 2
Bailey's jurisdictional holding is almost certainly wrong. The Court framed its
conclusion as a necessary implication of the general principle, discussed
above,453 that a litigant may not invoke federal question jurisdiction with a federal
claim that is "wholly insubstantial, legally speaking nonexistent."454 That rule
requires federal courts to determine whether a substantial federal issue appears
on the face of a well-pleaded complaint.4 55 A plaintiff cannot establish federal ju-
risdiction by bringing a claim that is squarely foreclosed by binding precedent.4 56
A plaintiff whose claims are clearly established by binding precedent, in contrast,
properly invokes a federal court's jurisdiction because its claims are not only sub-
stantial, but meritorious. If the Court consistently applied its holding in Bailey, a
plaintiff with a clearly established constitutional claim would be not only denied
the chance to litigate before a three-judge district court, but wholly barred from
446. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (per curiam).
447. See id. at 34.
448. See id. at 32.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 34.
451. Id. at 33.
452. Id. at 33-34.
453. See supra notes 436, 441 and accompanying text.
454. Bailey, 369 U.S. at 33. The U.S. Supreme Court has intimated that only its own rulings may
render a defense frivolous. See McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21, 29 n.9 (1975); cf. supra notes
442-45 and accompanying text (explaining how the Supreme Court has implied that court of appeals
precedent may be sufficient to render a plaintiff's claim insubstantial).
455. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
456. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
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federal court altogether. A defendant's lack of a valid, or even nonfrivolous,
defense does not diminish the substantiality of the plaintiff's federal claim.457
And parties may remain adverse to each other for constitutional purposes even if
the defendant lacks a valid defense.458 Thus, a plaintiff should not be able to plead
itself out of federal court because its claim is "too strong."
Admittedly, from a prudential standpoint, judicial economy is undoubtedly
advanced by eliminating the need for three-judge panels and direct Supreme
Court review in easy cases. Such efficiency gains are likely to be outweighed,
however, by requiring litigants to engage in meta-litigation over whether the
plaintiff's case is too meritorious for a three-judge court, especially when a wrong
conclusion can result in wasted proceedings, as in Bailey.
Regardless, Bailey remains good law. If a single district judge determines that
a plaintiff's claim is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, the judge
must rule in the plaintiff's favor without convening a three-judge panel, and the
case is subject to appeal to the court of appeals.45 9 Likewise, if the judge convenes
a three-judge panel, and the panel itself determines that precedent clearly estab-
lishes the plaintiff's claim, the panel must dissolve so the original district judge
may enter judgment for the plaintiff, again subject to appeal to the court of
appeals.460
When the U.S. Supreme Court determines that he plaintiff's claims in a case
appealed to it from a three-judge district court were clearly established by prece-
dent, it will dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and require the
appellant to proceed before the court of appeals instead.4 61 In adjudicating any
such appeals, of course, the court of appeals will apply its own precedent constru-
ing, interpreting, and applying the U.S. Supreme Court's case law. Although this
is a purely jurisdictional issue, it is directly related to the merits of the plaintiff's
claims and defendant's defenses. Thus, the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory yet
again requires three-judge district ourts to apply court of appeals precedent to
matters inextricably intertwined with the merits.
Fourth, a three-judge district court's ruling typically may be appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court only when it directly involves the merits of the issue that
gave rise to the court's jurisdiction.4 62 If the district court denies relief on other
grounds, such as the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the equitable requirements for
457. See Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) ("A defense is not part of a plaintiffs
properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.").
458. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The
Problems with Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637 (2014)
(discussing Article III's adverseness requirement).
459. Bailey, 369 U.S. at 33.
460. See, e.g., Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 1975).
461. Bailey, 369 U.S. at 34 (holding that a case that is not required to be heard by a three-judge panel
"cannot be brought here on direct appeal").
462. MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 804 (1975) (per curiam).
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injunctive relief,463 an affirmative defense such as laches,4 6 or abstention,46 5 the
case is subject to appeal in the court of appeals rather than the U.S. Supreme
Court. It would be impracticable to require a trial court to follow circuit precedent
when adjudicating defenses and other potentially dispositive issues in a case that
may be closely related to the merits, while allowing it to disregard circuit prece-
dent concerning the core constitutional question.
Fifth, notwithstanding section 1253, the court of appeals may review certain
three-judge district court rulings through other procedural vehicles such as man-
damus under the All Writs Act4 6 6 and interlocutory appeals under the collateral
467order doctrine. As noted earlier, a court of appeals may usually exercise appel-
late jurisdiction after final judgment to review a three-judge district court's rul-
ings on issues other than the central constitutional question i a case through to
the ordinary channels of appellate review.4 68 Building on this reasoning, courts of
appeals have exercised jurisdiction while proceedings remained pending in three-
judge district courts over petitions for writs of mandamus concerning discovery
orders469 and interlocutory appeals under the collateral order doctrine concerning
matters such as Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.470 The potential for
interlocutory review of three-judge courts' rulings in the courts of appeals exacer-
bates the difficulties of concluding that three-judge courts are bound only by
Supreme Court precedent.
In conclusion, even if one accepts the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory of vertical
stare decisis, three-judge district courts should still reat court of appeals' prece-
dents as binding. Numerous rulings by three-judge district courts-many of
463. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 (1974) (identifying dismissal
for lack of "equitable jurisdiction" as an "issue[] short of the merits" that does not warrant a direct
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court); see, e.g., Fishman v. Schaffer, 429 U.S. 1325, 1325 n.2 (Marshall,
Circuit Justice 1976) ("In view of the District Court's denial of relief on equitable grounds without
deciding the merits of the constitutional attack, applicants properly sought review initially in the Court
of Appeals.").
464. See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1316, 1316 (Powell, Circuit Justice 1976) (denying
application for a stay because the district court's decision was based on laches, rather than the merits of
the claim, and the court of appeals therefore had appellate jurisdiction).
465. See MTM, Inc., 420 U.S. at 804; see, e.g., B. Coleman Corp. v. Walker, 400 F. Supp. 1355, 1358
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (dismissing case on Younger grounds without convening three-judge panel), aff d, 547
F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1976) (unpublished table decision).
466. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012); see, e.g., Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Larose, 761 F. App'x 506,
511-15 (6th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that mandamus was available against a three-judge district court
panel, but declining to order it).
467. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
468. MTM, Inc., 420 U.S. at 804; 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
469. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 761 F. App'x at 510; Breed v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 F.2d 1114,
1114-15 (9th Cir. 1976); see also In re Slagle, 504 U.S. 952, 953 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from
dismissal) (opining that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of mandamus
challenging the refusal of a member of a three-judge court to recuse); cf. Blay v. Young, 509 F.2d 650,
651 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding, pre-MTM, that 28 U.S.C. § 1253 precludes courts of appeals from
exercising jurisdiction to grant mandamus to order a three-judge district court to grant an intervention
motion).
470. NAACP v. Merrill, 939 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 2019).
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which are closely intertwined with the merits of the underlying cases-are sub-
ject to appeal in the courts of appeals rather than the U.S. Supreme Court. It
would raise a serious risk of inconsistent reasoning or contradictory conclusions
to allow a district court to apply a different body of precedent o the main consti-
tutional issue in a case than to the wide range of other jurisdictional, equitable,
ancillary, defense-related, procedural, and other closely related questions it must
adjudicate. The sheer breadth and diversity of three-judge district court rulings
that are subject (or potentially subject) to review in the courts of appeals make it
impracticable for three-judge panels to pick and choose when to apply court of
appeals precedent.
CONCLUSION
Under the Hybrid Theory of stare decisis, a court must presumptively follow
the precedent not only of tribunals that may exercise appellate jurisdiction over a
particular case, but also of courts that are superior to it within the judicial hierar-
chy. The Hybrid Theory suggests that a three-judge district court should follow
the precedent of its regional court of appeals, even though many of its rulings are
subject to direct appeal exclusively to the U.S. Supreme Court. Nearly a century's
worth of statutes concerning three-judge trial courts confirms that Congress has
not been legislating against the backdrop of Appellate Jurisdiction Theory alone.
Moreover, other modem nonstandard appellate structures appear far more con-
sistent with the Hybrid Theory than the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory. A wide
range of practical, purposive, and structural considerations also counsel strongly
in favor of treating court of appeals precedent as binding on three-judge district
courts.
Even if one accepts the Appellate Jurisdiction Theory, however, three-judge
district courts' rulings concerning justiciability, the existence of a substantial fed-
eral question, the propriety of injunctive relief, affirmative defenses, abstention,
issues subject o mandamus or immediate relief under the collateral order doc-
trine, and other jurisdictional, procedural, evidentiary, and ancillary issues are
subject to review in the courts of appeals. The breadth of these issues and the
close relationship many of them have to the merits confirm that, even under the
Appellate Jurisdiction Theory, three-judge district courts should treat court of
appeals precedent as binding. Enforcing vertical stare decisis helps constrain the
discretion of three-judge district courts as they adjudicate some of the most sensi-
tive cases in our democracy; promotes judicial economy; and ensures that liti-
gants within a circuit are treated equitably and protected by the same body of
precedent, regardless of whether their claims fall within a three-judge panel's
jurisdiction.
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